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WATT NOW?: SMART METER DATA  
POST-CARPENTER 
Abstract: Smart meters, which automatically relay energy consumption data to 
utility companies, are increasingly displacing traditional energy meters. Data col-
lected from smart meters has elicited widespread concern because it can reveal 
considerable information about what goes on inside a home. For example, smart 
meter data can uncover when a person is home, away, or asleep. Historically, util-
ity records have not been afforded Fourth Amendment protection due to the third-
party doctrine: a person forfeits Fourth Amendment rights when information is 
voluntarily conveyed to third parties. In 2018, however, the Supreme Court in 
Carpenter v. United States recognized an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights 
in data held by a third party. In doing so, Carpenter held that a warrant is re-
quired in the “rare case” where a person has Fourth Amendment rights in data 
held by a private third party. Additionally, in 2018, the Seventh Circuit held in 
Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville that individuals have 
Fourth Amendment rights in the collection of their smart meter data in certain 
circumstances. Naperville did not address law enforcement access to smart meter 
data. This Note explains why smart meter data deserves Fourth Amendment pro-
tection and posits that smart meter data should fit squarely within the “rare case” 
envisioned by the Supreme Court in Carpenter. As such, this Note argues that a 
warrant supported by probable cause be required for law enforcement to access 
smart meter data. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, there has long been concern about the level of gov-
ernment encroachment into the private affairs of citizens.1 In the context of the 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195, 
220 (1890) (tracing the development of legal remedies enacted to protect a person’s right “to be let 
alone” and noting that the common law has historically treated “a man’s house as his castle”). The 
Right to Privacy, a famous article written in 1890 by Samuel D. Warren and Louis Brandeis, gave rise 
to state recognition of privacy torts. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUN-
DAMENTALS 39 (2017); see James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 875, 877 (1979) (attrib-
uting the tort of invasion of privacy to Warren and Brandeis); Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis and 
Warren’s The Right to Privacy and the Birth of the Right to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623, 624 
(2002) (describing the article as “legendary” and the driving force behind a “right to privacy” in the 
United States); Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and Brandeis, 39 
CATH. U.L. REV. 703, 704 (1990) (noting that Warren and Brandeis “gave birth” to privacy law). 
Warren and Brandeis feared tabloids and what might result from technological developments, such as 
instant photography and audio recordings. See Warren & Brandeis, supra, at 195 (arguing that techno-
logical advancements “threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall 
be proclaimed from the house-tops’”). Today, we are living in an age where ‘Alexa’ and ‘Siri’ are so 
786 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:785 
home, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects “[t]he right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against un-
reasonable searches and seizures.”2 The concept of a home being an individu-
al’s “castle and fortress” can be traced back to the ingenuity of English judge 
Sir Edward Coke.3 Moreover, the infamous “writs of assistance” that allowed 
British officers to enter any home without notice, was one of the factors that 
led to the American Revolution.4 
Recently, smart meters have raised concerns about privacy in the home.5 
More troublesome than a nosy neighbor, smart meters have the potential to 
track and record what a person does in the home to a high degree of accuracy.6 
Smart meters are the result of modernized traditional gas and energy meters.7 
                                                                                                                           
commonplace that people can confuse their “servant robots.” Pepto Abysmal (@roastedryebread), TWIT-
TER (Jan. 9, 2019, 10:19 AM), https://twitter.com/roastedryebread/status/1083065853518655489 
[https://perma.cc/6Y9W-GQB7]. Alexa is a device engineered by Amazon, which acts as a “virtual 
assistant,” designed to be used in a person’s home. Kim Wetzel, What Is Alexa, and What Can Ama-
zon’s Virtual Assistant Do for You?, DIGITAL TRENDS (Feb. 16, 2019), https://www.digitaltrends.
com/home/what-is-amazons-alexa-and-what-can-it-do/ [https://perma.cc/R2YW-U95S]. Alexa can 
help perform various tasks such as playing music, turning on lights, and looking up information 
online. Id. Siri, an Apple service, performs similar functions. See APPLE, https://www.apple.com/siri/ 
[https://perma.cc/75MF-P7QH] (noting that Siri can set alarms, find directions, play music, unlock 
doors, and turn on lights). 
 2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
 3 See Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 194–95 (K.B. 1604) (noting that “the house of every 
one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his 
repose”). 
 4 Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967). 
 5 See Cheryl D. Balough, Privacy Implications of Smart Meters, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 161, 161, 
190–91 (2011) (discussing some of the privacy concerns associated with smart meters and advocating 
for a federal legislative action to safeguard individual privacy); Natasha Duarte, The Home Out of 
Context: The Post-Riley Fourth Amendment and Law Enforcement Collection of Smart Meter Data, 
93 N.C. L .REV. 1140, 1144 (2015) (explaining that smart meter data can be analyzed to reveal private 
information); Megan McLean, How Smart Is Too Smart?: How Privacy Concerns Threaten Modern 
Energy Infrastructure, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 879, 885 (2016) (recognizing that smart meters 
can reveal personal details about what a person does in their home and can be valuable to law en-
forcement). 
 6 See CONG. RES. SERV., SMART METER DATA: PRIVACY AND CYBERSECURITY 3–4 (2012) 
[hereinafter CRS SMART METER REPORT] (noting that smart meters provide granular information 
about energy data consumption by measuring data consumption every fifteen minutes); see also Car-
penter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (demonstrating that cell phone carriers are not 
like typical witnesses: “unlike the nosy neighbor who keeps an eye on comings and goings, they are 
ever alert, and their memory is nearly infallible”). In the case of smart meter data, if a nosy neighbor 
watches your home to see when the lights go on and off, he or she might be able to infer your daily 
routine—when you wake up in the morning, when you go to sleep, when you are home, and when you 
leave. See id. (distinguishing a cell phone carrier from a nosy neighbor). Unlike a nosy neighbor, 
however, a smart meter is always present and collecting precise data to a high degree of certainty. See 
id. (noting that there is a difference between what information a neighbor could gather and what in-
formation a cell phone carrier can gather); CRS SMART METER REPORT, supra, at 4 (describing the 
detailed nature of frequent smart meter data collection). 
 7 NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., GUIDELINES FOR SMART GRID CYBER SECURITY: VOL. 2, 
PRIVACY AND THE SMART GRID 2 (2014) [hereinafter NIST SMART GRID REPORT]. 
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Traditional meters require an employee to manually check and report how 
much electricity is used each month.8 In contrast, smart meters can wirelessly 
send data to utility companies every fifteen minutes.9 As a result, compared to 
the one lump sum number collected in a traditional meter each month, smart 
meter data is more precise because the data is collected every fifteen minutes.10 
Because of this frequent data collection, smart meter data can reveal what appli-
ances are present in a home and when they are in use.11 By tracking a person’s 
interactions with home appliances, smart meter data can uncover, for example, 
when a person is home, away, or asleep.12 These types of inferences can be 
extremely threatening to the privacy that a person expects to have in her home, 
a place traditionally deserving of the highest privacy protections.13 
                                                                                                                           
 8 Id. 
 9 CRS SMART METER REPORT, supra note 6, at 3–4. A smart meter is part of an Advanced Meter-
ing Infrastructure (AMI). Id. at 1. AMI refers to the complete measuring, collection, and communica-
tion system between the customer and a utility provider. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ADVANCED METER-
ING INFRASTRUCTURE AND CUSTOMER SYSTEM: RESULTS FROM THE SMART GRID INVESTMENT 
GRANT PROGRAM 4 (2016) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, AMI REPORT]. 
 10 CRS SMART METER REPORT, supra note 6, at 3–4; see also NIST SMART GRID REPORT, supra 
note 7, at 9 (finding that most smart meters collect data either once every hour or once every fifteen 
minutes). 
 11 CRS SMART METER REPORT, supra note 6, at 4. This is because each appliance has a unique 
electric load signature which corresponds to energy usage. Id. For example, a television uses power 
differently than a refrigerator. Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 
524 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 12 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DATA ACCESS AND PRIVACY ISSUES RELATED TO SMART GRID 
TECHNOLOGIES 2 (2010) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SMART GRID REPORT]. Smart meters 
can discern: 
Whether individuals tend to cook microwavable meals or meals on the stove; whether 
they have breakfast; the time at which individuals are at home; whether a house has an 
alarm system and how often it is activated; when occupants usually shower; when the 
TV and/or computer is on; whether appliances are in good condition; the number of 
gadgets in the home; if the home has a washer and dryer and how often they are used; 
whether lights and appliances are used at odd hours, such as in the middle of the night; 
whether and how often exercise equipment such as a treadmill is used. 
INFORMATION & PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF ONTARIO & THE FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, SMART 
PRIVACY FOR THE SMART GRID: EMBEDDING PRIVACY INTO THE DESIGN OF ELECTRICITY CONSER-
VATION 11 (2009) [hereinafter SMARTPRIVACY FOR THE SMART GRID]. In addition, smart meters can 
provide the inference that a person is “sleep deprived,” infrequently does laundry, or is typically away 
from the home until bars close. Id.; see Rouzbeh Razavi, Rethinking the Privacy of the Smart Grid: 
What Your Smart Meter Data Can Reveal About Your Household in Ireland, 44 ENERGY RES. & SOC. 
SCI. 312, 312–23 (2018) (using various algorithms to accurately predict household size). 
 13 See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (emphasizing that the home is “first among 
equals” in the eyes of the Fourth Amendment); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (find-
ing that “privacy expectations are most heightened” in the context of the home); Oliver v. United 
States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (reaffirming the notion that the Fourth Amendment applies to areas 
“immediately surrounding and associated with the home”); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 
511 (1961) (noting that “at the very core” of the Fourth Amendment “stands the right of a man to 
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion”); Stephanie M. 
Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 
788 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:785 
Smart meter data could be invaluable in criminal investigations.14 Courts 
have concluded that law enforcement access to similar utility records is not a 
“search” under the Fourth Amendment due to the third-party doctrine—the 
principle that the Fourth Amendment does not protect information that is vol-
untarily disclosed to a third party.15 In 2018, however, the Supreme Court in 
Carpenter v. United States limited the application of the third-party doctrine by 
refusing to apply it to records containing cell-site location information.16 In-
stead, the Court held that when a person has a significant privacy interest in 
records stored with a third party—a “rare case”—a search requires a warrant.17 
In doing so, Carpenter effectively limited the blanket application of the third-
party doctrine and required a case-by-case evaluation to determine a person’s 
                                                                                                                           
905, 912–13 (2010) (referring to the home as a “sacred site” in Supreme Court Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence and describing the Fourth Amendment protections of the home as an “enshrinement,” 
reaching an “iconic status”). 
 14 Duarte, supra note 5, at 1140–41; see Daniel Zwerdling, Your Home Is Your . . . Snitch?, MAR-
SHALL PROJECT (May 24, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/05/24/your-home-is-your-
snitch, [https://perma.cc/W5YN-8R7K] (discussing how smart appliances could aid law enforcement 
in monitoring individuals). For example, law enforcement could use the data to determine whether a 
home contains a marijuana grow light or whether someone was home when she claimed to be. See, 
e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212 (involving a situation where law enforcement sought to identify a 
person’s location at specific moments in time to determine whether it was feasible for that person to 
have committed a crime); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001) (describing a law enforce-
ment agent’s use of a high energy meter reading to confirm the fact that a person was growing mariju-
ana in his home). A person’s habits in the home can also be important for determining whether a per-
son has the authority to consent to a Fourth Amendment search of the home. See, e.g., United States v. 
Corral, 339 F. Supp. 2d 781, 792 (W.D. Tex. 2004) (explaining that a housekeeper could not consent 
to a search of the defendant’s home because she only cleaned the house a couple of times per week); 
State v. Shumaker, 914 So. 2d 1156, 1167 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a babysitter had the au-
thority to consent to search common areas of the home and the trailer in the yard because she often 
stayed overnight at the residence). 
 15 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting “unreasonable searches and seizures”); United States 
v. McIntyre, 646 F.3d 1107, 1111–12 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that the Fourth Amendment did not 
apply because power records were voluntarily conveyed to the utility company); United States v. 
Porco, 842 F. Supp. 1393, 1398 (D. Wyo. 1994) (denying Fourth Amendment protection to energy 
records); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment did not apply when the defendant dialed numbers on his phone because he voluntarily communi-
cated that information to the phone company for a business purpose); United States v. Miller, 425 
U.S. 435, 440 (1976) (finding that business records of banks are not like “private papers” typically 
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection). The third-party doctrine has been a source of legal contro-
versy. Compare Orin Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009) 
(defending the third-party doctrine) [hereinafter Kerr, Case for the Third-Party Doctrine] with Susan 
W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared Privacy Rights in Stored 
Transactional Data, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 211 (2006) (arguing that Smith, Miller, and other third-party 
doctrine cases were wrongly decided). See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2261–72 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the third-party doctrine). 
 16 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.  
 17 Id. at 2222. 
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privacy interest in records held by a third party.18 As a result, Carpenter 
opened the door for courts to consider the applicability of the Fourth Amend-
ment to smart meter data.19 
In fact, in 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit relied 
on Carpenter in holding that a public utility’s collection of smart meter data is 
a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.20 Although the Seventh Cir-
cuit did not address law enforcement collection of smart meter data,21 officers 
are likely to request such data in the near future due to the helpful inferences 
that the data can provide.22 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See id. at 2222–23 (holding that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-site 
location information data). 
 19 See Balough, supra note 5, at 183–85 (finding that pre-Carpenter case law might not be suffi-
cient to find that the Fourth Amendment applies to smart meter data); Mihailis E. Diamantis, Privileg-
ing Privacy: Confidentiality as a Source of Fourth Amendment Protection, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
486, 488–90 (2018) (discussing Carpenter’s re-shaping of the third-party doctrine); Duarte, supra 
note 5, at 1164 (positing that the Fourth Amendment fails to protect smart meter data due to the third-
party doctrine); Jessica Lile, Comment, Internet Privacy Regulations and the Carpenter Decision, 87 
UMKC L. REV. 777, 799 (2019) (arguing that Carpenter’s holding allows for a Fourth Amendment 
application to data sought from Internet Service Providers); McLean, supra note 5, at 894 (contending 
that smart meter data is not protected by the Fourth Amendment due to the third-party doctrine and the 
“general public use” exception); Nameir Abbas et al., Carpenter Ruling May Be Turning Point in 
Digital Data Privacy, LAW360 (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1069397/carpenter-
ruling-may-be-turning-point-in-digital-data-privacy [https://perma.cc/VN8U-37CV] (examining Car-
penter’s cutting back of the third-party doctrine). See generally CRS SMART METER REPORT, supra 
note 6, at 6–22 (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s applicability to smart meter data pre-Carpenter). 
 20 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 527, 529. 
 21 Id. Naperville was a civil case involving a public utility that installed smart meters without the 
consent of Naperville citizens. Id.  
 22 NIST SMART GRID REPORT, supra note 7, at 11; see Eoghan McKenna et al., Smart Meter 
Data: Balancing Consumer Privacy Concerns with Legitimate Applications, 41 ENERGY POL’Y 807, 
808 (2012) (summarizing privacy concerns associated with smart meters). Amazon’s “Alexa” exem-
plifies some of the privacy concerns resulting from new technology. Niraj Chokshi, Is Alexa Listen-
ing? Amazon Echo Sent Out Recording of Couple’s Conversation, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/25/business/amazon-alexa-conversation-shared-echo.html [https://
perma.cc/EN96-9HJR]. This is because of Alexa’s ability to listen and record audio when inactive. Id. 
Specifically, Alexa activates when the wake word “Alexa” is spoken. Id. To hear the wake word, 
however, Alexa must always be listening. Id. Moreover, Alexa records audio a few seconds before 
and after the wake word is spoken. Id. If the user does not delete this data, Amazon keeps these rec-
ords indefinitely. Sharon Profis & Rick Broida, Amazon Echo Saves All Your Voice Data. Here’s How 
to Delete It., CNET (May 31, 2018), https://www.cnet.com/how-to/amazon-echo-saves-all-your-
voice-data-heres-how-to-delete-them/ [https://perma.cc/MK54-PAAS]. Recently, law enforcement has 
requested data from Amazon’s “Alexa” to help aid in murder investigations. See, e.g., Cyrus Farivar, 
Alexa: What Did You Hear?—Amazon Must Give Up Echo Recordings in Double Murder Case, Judge 
Rules, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 10, 2018), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/11/amazon-must-
give-up-echo-recordings-in-double-murder-case-judge-rules/ [https://perma.cc/JDL4-AAW9] (dis-
cussing the seizing of Alexa audio data, and information about whose phone was connected to the 
Alexa in connection with a January 2017 New Hampshire murder case where two women were mur-
dered in a kitchen that contained an Alexa device); Elliot C. McLaughlin, Suspect OKs Amazon to 
Hand Over Echo Recordings in Murder Case, CNN (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/
07/tech/amazon-echo-alexa-bentonville-arkansas-murder-case/index.html [https://perma.cc/XY5L-
790 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:785 
Part I of this Note develops the Fourth Amendment framework for 
searches of the home and provides a history of the third-party doctrine.23 Part I 
also explains the legal standards involved when law enforcement obtains a 
subpoena and a warrant.24 Part II summarizes Carpenter’s recognition of an 
individual’s Fourth Amendment rights in remotely stored information.25 Part 
III provides an overview of smart meter data and discusses the Seventh Circuit 
case that recognizes the privacy interests in smart meter data.26 Part IV ex-
plains why the collection of smart meter data implicates the Fourth Amend-
ment.27 Part IV also argues that law enforcement should be allowed to access 
smart meter data, whether held by a public or private utility company, only 
after first obtaining a warrant.28 
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S APPLICABILITY TO SMART METER DATA 
Access to smart meter data by law enforcement raises significant privacy 
concerns.29 For example, how does society grapple with Fourth Amendment 
protections at a time when technology is rapidly advancing?30 There is a deli-
                                                                                                                           
W6QM] (describing a 2017 Arkansas murder case and noting that Alexa audio recordings were sought 
when a witness noted that Alexa was streaming music during the night in question). In the 2017 Ar-
kansas murder case, prosecutors sought data from the suspect’s smart water heater because it showed 
that the suspect used an abnormally large amount of water early in the morning, indicating an attempt 
to clean up the murder. Id. Similarly, prosecutors sought Siri data in connection with a 2012 Florida 
murder, during which a man asked Siri where he could hide a dead body and then proceeded to use his 
flashlight application on his phone nine times. Yoni Heisler, Murder Suspect Asks Siri Where to Hide 
a Dead Body, NETWORK WORLD (Aug. 13, 2014), https://www.networkworld.com/article/2464546/
murder-suspect-asks-siri-where-to-hide-a-dead-body.html [https://perma.cc/D9FC-XS9L]. 
 23 See infra notes 29–96 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 97–139 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 140–185 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 186–247 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 248–288 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 289–320 and accompanying text. 
 29 CRS SMART METER REPORT, supra note 6, at 5; NIST SMART GRID REPORT, supra note 7, at 
11; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, AMI REPORT, supra note 9, at 4; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SMART GRID 
REPORT, supra note 12, at 49; Balough, supra note 5, at 191; Duarte, supra note 5, at 1140–41; 
McLean, supra note 5, at 885. 
 30 See Balough, supra note 5, at 171–72 (noting that smart meter data could greatly benefit law 
enforcement agencies and discussing some of the privacy concerns arising therefrom); Orin Kerr, The 
Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 801, 805 (2004) (discussing an evolving Fourth Amendment framework in response to 
new technologies) [hereinafter Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies]. Notwithstand-
ing its benefits to society, technology has raised serious privacy concerns. See Nils Backe, Is Amazon 
Alexa Invading Privacy? Analysis of an Ethical Dilemma, MEDIUM (Nov. 26, 2018), https://medium.
com/@nils.backe/is-amazon-alexa-invading-privacy-analysis-of-an-ethical-dilemma-f7e064ab6dba 
[https://perma.cc/TX5Q-LJ69] (discussing several consumer privacy issues involved in Alexa data but 
concluding that Amazon is acting ethically and responsibly given its role as a leader in the technology 
space); Eli Blumenthal, Facebook’s Latest Privacy Scandal: What We Know About the Company’s 
Handling of User Data, USA TODAY (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2018/
12/19/facebooks-latest-privacy-scandal-what-we-know-now/2361257002/ [https://perma.cc/F4VF-
2020] Smart Meter Data Post-Carpenter 791 
cate balance between protecting Fourth Amendment rights and enabling law 
enforcement to investigate crimes effectively.31 As a result, the Supreme Court 
has recognized the need for a flexible approach to the Fourth Amendment to 
protect against encroachment into private spheres in the digital age.32 
This Part explores the current Fourth Amendment framework as applied 
to searches of the home, particularly in the context of utility data.33 Section A 
of this Part provides a summary of the Fourth Amendment framework and 
highlights three areas of the Fourth Amendment that may apply to smart meter 
data.34 Section B explores several different mechanisms by which the govern-
ment may compel the production of records and the different legal standards 
for each. 35 Section B then examines how law enforcement agencies use sub-
poenas to access traditional energy data and smart meter data.36 
A. Fourth Amendment Framework 
To trigger the Fourth Amendment, there are two requirements.37 First, 
there must be government action.38 Second, the government action must be 
                                                                                                                           
TFBG] (explaining various privacy scandals involving Facebook, including the Facebook Cambridge 
Analytica scandal, arising after Facebook collected personal information of users and sold it to third 
parties); Bennett Cyphers, Data Privacy Scandals and Public Policy Picking Up Speed: 2018 in Re-
view, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/12/data-
privacy-scandals-and-public-policy-picking-speed-2018-year-review [https://perma.cc/P7NH-ZKPV] 
(describing major privacy scandals of technology companies, such as Facebook and Google); Julia 
Pagnamenta, Can Alexa Testify Against You?, CRIME REP. (Mar. 22, 2018), https://thecrimereport.org/
2018/03/22/alexa-get-me-the-first-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/3JNN-TJ77] (explaining the privacy 
implications of Alexa data and the applicability of the First Amendment and Fourth Amendment to 
Alexa data). See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN 
THE INFORMATION AGE (2004) (shedding light on how technology allows for a greater free flow of 
personal information, which can pose a large threat to privacy). In response to these privacy concerns, 
legislatures have begun to tackle privacy issues more seriously. Cyphers, supra. 
 31 See ROBERT M. BLOOM, SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND WARRANTS 46 (2003) (arguing that so-
ciety is worse off if police are heavily restricted because it makes it harder to investigate crimes). 
 32 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (noting that “[a]s technology has enhanced the Government’s 
capacity to encroach upon areas normally guarded from inquisitive eyes, this Court has sought to 
‘assure [] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted’” (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34)); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 28 (rejecting a “me-
chanical interpretation” of the Fourth Amendment). 
 33 See infra notes 29–185 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 37–96 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 97–120 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 121–139 and accompanying text. 
 37 ROBERT M. BLOOM & MARK S. BRODIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE CONSTITUTION AND 
THE POLICE 17 (8th ed. 2016). The Fourth Amendment protects “persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 38 See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (holding that an illegal search conducted 
by private persons did not implicate the Fourth Amendment). This Note assumes that there has al-
ready been some level of state action that has triggered the Fourth Amendment. Compare People v. 
Perlos, 462 N.W.2d 310, 314 (Mich. 1990) (holding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to a 
blood draw because there was no state action), with Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 
792 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:785 
considered a “search” or a “seizure.”39 If these requirements are met, the 
Fourth Amendment applies and a court must determine whether the search was 
reasonable.40 In 1967, in Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court abandoned a 
strict application of the Fourth Amendment in favor of a flexible one.41 Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence later became the Katz test, or the “reasonable expectation 
of privacy” test, recognizing that a Fourth Amendment search could occur 
without physical entry.42 To determine whether the Fourth Amendment applies, 
the Katz test asks two questions: (1) whether there is a subjective reasonable 
expectation of privacy; and (2) if there is, whether that expectation is one that 
society would recognize as reasonable.43 
Three different categories of cases are relevant when considering the 
Fourth Amendment implications on the collection of smart meter data by law 
enforcement.44 One category discusses the reasonable expectations of privacy 
that individuals have in the home.45 Another considers what expectations of 
                                                                                                                           
1992) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment applied to a state statute that required felons to submit 
blood samples). It is important to emphasize that Naperville involved non-criminal, non-investigatory 
conduct. Naperville, 900 F.3d at 529. In that case, the court found “state action” simply because the 
public utility collecting the data was owned by the state. Id. at 528. The public utility existed to per-
form traditional utility company tasks and did not aim to “spy” on its residents by installing smart 
meters in every citizen’s home in Naperville. See id. (explaining that Naperville did not install smart 
meters with “prosecutorial intent”). 
 39 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
 40 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (emphasizing that “the touchstone of 
the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness”). 
 41 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (holding that the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) placing of a 
recording device on a phone booth to record a suspect’s conversations was an unconstitutional 
search); see U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting “persons, houses, papers, and effects”). Historically, 
the Fourth Amendment applied only to those areas enumerated in the amendment. U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV. Prior to 1967, a Fourth Amendment “search” took place when there was a common law 
trespass. See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942) (examining whether a search 
was made via illegal trespass); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464–66, (1928), overruled by 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 347, and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 41 (1967) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment was not violated when a government agent wiretapped a phone because there was no 
trespass).  
 42 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). This test has been widely criticized. See general-
ly Kevin Emas & Tamara Pallas, United States v. Jones: Does Katz Still Have Nine Lives?, 24 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 116 (2012); Orin Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Ex-
pectations, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 113 (2015); Daniel T. Pesciotta, I’m Not Dead Yet: Katz, Jones, and 
the Fourth Amendment in the 21st Century, 63 CASE W. RES. 187 (2012); Matthew Tokson, Blank 
Slates, 59 B.C. L. REV. 591 (2018). 
 43 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Castaneda, 494 
F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that license plate numbers are not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment because a person’s subjective expectation of privacy in a license plate number is not one 
society would recognize as reasonable). 
 44 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215–16 (analyzing the Fourth Amendment claim by looking at 
the applicable cases in two categories). 
 45 See infra notes 49–61 and accompanying text. 
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privacy individuals have in information turned over to third parties.46 The final 
category is a new area represented by Carpenter and other similarly situated 
cases that do not fit neatly into the existing Fourth Amendment framework.47 
Each of these categories is examined below.48 
1. Expectation of Privacy in the Home 
The Supreme Court has consistently placed a high value on privacy inside 
the home and in areas surrounding the home.49 In 2001, the Supreme Court, in 
Kyllo v. United States, held that the collection of thermal images of a person’s 
home by law enforcement, taken from outside of the home, was a search.50 
There, a federal agent suspected that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana.51 
To investigate his suspicions, the agent used a thermal imaging device to scan 
Kyllo’s home.52 The scan revealed that parts of the home emanated an abnor-
mal amount of heat, consistent with halide heat lamps typically used to grow 
marijuana.53 
Recognizing that the agent engaged in a “more than naked-eye surveil-
lance of a home,” the Court emphasized that the thermal imaging device al-
lowed law enforcement to obtain information it otherwise would not have been 
able to access without physical entry.54 Holding that the scan was a warrantless 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See infra notes 62–73 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra notes 74–96 and accompanying text. 
 48 See infra notes 49–96 and accompanying text. 
 49 BLOOM & BRODIN, supra note 37, at 27; see Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6 (recognizing the home as 
the “first among equals” and holding that the Fourth Amendment applied to a dog sniff of a home); 
Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511 (emphasizing that “[a]t the very core stands the right of a man to retreat 
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion”); Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (noting that the Fourth Amendment protects the “sanctity of a man’s 
home”). Additionally, courts have protected the area immediately surrounding the home, referred to as 
the “curtilage.” See, e.g., Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1670 (2018) (finding that a driveway 
was “curtilage” of the home and the Fourth Amendment’s protections of curtilage has “long been 
black letter law”); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212–13 (noting that the Fourth Amendment’s protection of the 
“curtilage” is “essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately linked to 
the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations are most heightened”); see 
also Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58–59 (1924) (holding that law enforcement can gather 
information in “open fields” because such fields are not enumerated in the Fourth Amendment). 
 50 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. Additionally, officers subpoenaed the utility company and determined 
that he had increased electricity usage. Id. at 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 51 Id. at 29 (majority opinion). 
 52 Id. Thermal imaging devices detect infrared radiation and convert the radiation into an image. 
Id. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, SYSTEM ASSESSMENT AND VALIDATION FOR 
EMERGENCY RESPONDERS: HAND-HELD THERMAL IMAGING DEVICES (2007) (describing the science 
behind thermal imaging devices). The image is created based on a correlation of warmth to color, 
where black corresponds to cold and white corresponds to hot. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29–30. 
 53 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30. Specifically, the scan revealed that the garage roof and a side wall were 
exceptionally warm compared to the rest of the home. Id. Moreover, the scan showed that these parts 
of Kyllo’s home were significantly hotter than other homes in the area. Id. 
 54 Id. at 33, 40. 
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search, the Court found it significant that the thermal imaging device was not 
“in general public use.”55 Moreover, the Court recognized that an inference can 
give rise to a Fourth Amendment violation.56 Although the thermal device 
merely showed images, the images led to the inference that Kyllo was growing 
marijuana.57 Ultimately, the Supreme Court pronounced that, absent a warrant, 
the government could not capitalize on technology to explore what was going 
on inside a home because it would leave homeowners “at the mercy of advanc-
ing technology.”58 
In addition to the line of cases recognizing the expectation of privacy in 
the home, there may also be an expectation of privacy in information given to 
third parties.59 This is relevant for smart meter data because the data is typical-
ly sent to a third-party utility company.60 
2. Expectation of Privacy in Information Voluntarily Turned Over to Third 
Parties 
The third-party doctrine is an exception to the Katz test.61 It is the notion 
that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
voluntarily provided to third parties.62 Between 1952 and 1971, the Supreme 
Court created and developed the third-party doctrine in the context of “secret 
agents,” or undercover police officers.63 In those cases, the Court held that a 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Id. at 34. The dissent criticized the majority’s interjection of the “general public use” standard 
because it allows Fourth Amendment protections to disappear merely when the relevant technology is 
popular. Id. at 46–47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Moreover, the dissent highlighted the imprecise nature 
of general public use, noting that it is difficult to determine how prevalent the technology must be to 
brand it in general public use. Id. at 47. In addition, the dissent criticized the majority for hastily con-
cluding that thermal images were not in general public use without discussing the prevalence of ther-
mal image devices. Id.; see Douglas Adkins, Note, The Supreme Court Announces a Fourth Amend-
ment “General Public Use” Standard for Emerging Technologies but Fails to Define It: Kyllo v. 
United States, 27 U. DAYTON L. REV. 245, 252–67 (2002) (criticizing the “general public use” doc-
trine). 
 56 Kyllo, 533 U.S at 36. The Court rejected the dissent’s argument that information revealed by an 
inference could not be considered a search. Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 35. 
 59 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222 (holding that a warrant is required in the “rare case” where a 
person has Fourth Amendment rights in data held by a third party). 
 60 NIST SMART GRID REPORT, supra note 7, at 11. But see Naperville, 900 F.3d at 527 (finding 
that the public utility was not a third party because the information flowed directly from the citizens to 
the utility). 
 61 Robert M. Bloom & William T. Clark, Small Cells, Big Problems: The Increasing Precision of 
Cell Site Location Information and the Need for Fourth Amendment Protections, 106 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 167, 178, 181 (2016). 
 62 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44; Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
 63 Kerr, Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 15, at 567–69; see United States v. White, 
401 U.S. 745, 750 (1971) (involving a confession of crimes to a friend wearing a wire); Hoffa v. Unit-
ed States, 385 U.S. 293, 296 (1966) (addressing a person’s incriminating statements to a co-worker 
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person’s Fourth Amendment rights are not violated when a person voluntarily 
shares information with a government actor, even if the person does so un-
knowingly.64 For example, in 1971, the Supreme Court considered whether the 
Fourth Amendment applied to self-incriminating statements that were made to 
an undercover informant in United States v. White.65 There, the Court consid-
ered the Katz test.66 A person should understand, the Court reasoned, that in-
formation disclosed to others could be relayed to the police.67 
Between 1973 and 1980, courts used the third-party doctrine in cases in-
volving business records.68 For example, in 1976, the Supreme Court held in 
United States v. Miller that a person who deposits money into a bank has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the checks and deposit slips retained by 
the bank.69 Similarly, in 1979, the Court held in Smith v. Maryland that, under 
                                                                                                                           
who was an undercover informant); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966) (concerning a 
sale of marijuana to an undercover agent); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 435 (1963) (involv-
ing an attempt to bribe an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent); Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 
757–58 (1952) (holding that the Fourth Amendment did not protect a person who made incriminating 
statements to a friend secretly working with the police). 
 64 See, e.g., White, 401 U.S. at 750 (holding that the third-party doctrine survived the Katz rea-
sonable expectation of privacy test); Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302 (noting that the Fourth Amendment does 
not protect “a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrong-
doing will not reveal it”); Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210 (finding that an application of the Fourth Amend-
ment to secret agent cases would impede undercover investigations). 
 65 White, 401 U.S. at 752. In White, an informant had several conversations with the defendant 
while wearing a wire. Id. at 747. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit erroneously inter-
preted Katz as overruling Lee, an undercover agent case. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, emphasiz-
ing that Katz did not disrupt the principle in Lee: The Fourth Amendment does not protect voluntary 
statements made to others who turn out to be working with the government. Id. at 750. 
 66 Id. at 750.  
 67 Id. at 752. 
 68 Kerr, Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 15, at 569–70; see Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–
44 (phone records); Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (bank records); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 340 
(1973) (tax documents). Some states offer stronger protections in business records when interpreting 
their own constitutions. See, e.g., Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590, 593 (Cal. 1974) (holding 
that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records); State v. Lunsford, 141 A.3d 
270, 284 (N.J. 2016) (finding that “telephone billing records, [and] bank records . . . disclose private 
information that is entitled to constitutional protection”); Commonwealth v. Dejohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 
1290 (Pa. 1979) (noting that the third-party doctrine “opens the door to a vast and unlimited range of 
very real abuses of police power”). 
 69 Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. There, the defendant argued that the collection of his bank records via 
a subpoena was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights because he had a privacy interest in the 
documents. Id. at 442. The Court reasoned that a person assumes the risk that information handed over 
to a third party may be conveyed to the government. Id. at 443. Ultimately, the court extended the 
third-party doctrine, finding that: 
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a 
third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is 
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confi-
dence placed in the third party will not be betrayed. 
Id. 
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the first prong of the Katz test, there is no subjective expectation of privacy in 
dialed telephone numbers, as the numbers are voluntarily conveyed to the tele-
phone company.70 Even if there were a subjective expectation of privacy, the 
Court held that, under the second prong of the Katz test, such an expectation 
was not one that society would recognize as reasonable.71 In both cases, the 
Court also considered the nature of the information in the records.72 In sum, 
business records were generally not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection 
due to the third-party doctrine.73 
3. The “Rare” Carpenter Case 
The Supreme Court in Carpenter held that police officers need a warrant 
to access cell-site location records.74 In doing so, the Court limited the applica-
tion of the third-party doctrine by refusing to apply the doctrine to records con-
taining cell-site location information (CSLI).75 Prior to Carpenter, courts had 
mechanically applied the third-party doctrine to all information voluntarily 
disclosed, such as information disclosed to an undercover police officer or a 
business.76 Similarly, courts applied the third-party doctrine to CSLI to con-
clude that no Fourth Amendment search occurred.77 In Carpenter, however, 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44. There, the defendant was making obscene phone calls to a woman. 
Id. at 737. The police used a pen register, an electronic device that records phone numbers that are 
called from someone’s phone, to reveal that the defendant was making the calls. Id. The Court held 
that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed from his 
phone because he provided that information to his cell phone provider, a third party. Id. at 743–44. 
 71 Id. at 744. 
 72 See id. at 741 (considering the information in the pen register and distinguishing it from the 
information obtained by the listening device in Katz); Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (noting that Katz re-
quires an inquiry into “the nature of the particular documents sought . . . to determine whether there is 
a legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’ concerning their contents”). 
 73 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44 (holding that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in phone records); Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (holding that a person does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in bank records). 
 74 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222. 
 75 Id. 
 76 See, e.g., Henderson v. State, 583 So. 2d 276 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (finding that a person has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in phone records); Kesler v. State, 291 S.E.2d 497 (Ga. 1982) 
(denying Fourth Amendment protection to phone records); State v. Schultz, 850 P.2d 818 (Kan. 1993) 
(applying the third party-doctrine to telephone and bank records). See generally Stephen E. Hender-
son, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth Amendment and Its State Analogs to 
Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U.L. REV. 373 (discussing 
states that have rejected the third-party doctrine). 
 77 United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 435 (4th Cir. 2016) (explaining that the government 
does not need a warrant to access cell-site location information (CSLI) because “the very act of dis-
closure negated any reasonable expectation of privacy”); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 531 
(11th Cir. 2015) (finding that the privacy interest in CSLI is indistinguishable from the privacy inter-
est in the phone records in Smith); In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 
724 F.3d 600, 606 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that law enforcement access to CSLI under the Stored 
Communications Act’s “specific and articulable facts” standard, which is lower than the Fourth 
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the Court concluded that “the fact that such information is gathered by a third 
party does not make it any less deserving of Fourth Amendment protection.”78 
In Carpenter, the Supreme Court limited the third-party doctrine in two 
ways.79 First, the Court evaluated the privacy interests contained in the record 
sought by the government.80 When a record discloses a “normal” amount of 
private information—such as a phone number—the third-party doctrine will 
likely still apply.81 On the other hand, when records reveal information war-
ranting increased privacy, or information beyond what society deems to be a 
“normal” amount, voluntary disclosure does not eliminate Fourth Amendment 
protections.82 Prior to Carpenter, courts generally only looked to whether rec-
ords were shared with a third party and did not necessarily consider the privacy 
interest in those records.83 In Carpenter, the Supreme Court held that, because 
CSLI is functionally a “dossier of physical movements,” it deserves the highest 
privacy protections.84 In fact, the Court distinguished Smith and Miller on the 
basis that those cases involved only limited types of personal information.85 
The Court recognized that “seismic shifts in digital technology” can generate 
highly personal information in records, rendering such records more deserving 
of privacy protections than those in Smith and Miller.86 
                                                                                                                           
Amendment’s probable cause standard, was not unconstitutional); State v. Perry, 776 S.E.2d 528, 542 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (concluding that the government’s request for CSLI was not considered a Fourth 
Amendment search). But see State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 327 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) (hold-
ing that “people have a reasonable expectation that their cell phones will not be used as real-time 
tracking devices”); Commonwealth v. Augustine, 35 N.E.3d 688, 694 (Mass. 2015) (requiring a war-
rant for CSLI). 
 78 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223. 
 79 See id. at 2217–20 (looking at the privacy interests and the voluntariness of the sharing of the 
information). 
 80 Id. at 2217. 
 81 Id.; see, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44 (refusing to recognize Fourth Amendment rights in the 
numbers that the defendant dialed from his phone). 
 82 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
 83 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44 (holding that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in phone records); Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (holding that a person does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in bank records); Graham, 824 F.3d at 425 (holding that voluntary disclosure 
of CSLI removes any reasonable expectation of privacy); Davis, 785 F.3d at 531 (finding that the 
defendant had a diminished expectation of privacy in CSLI records because a third party held the 
records). 
 84 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
 85 Id. at 2219. 
 86 Id.; see Bloom & Clark, supra note 61, at 174–76 (discussing the rising popularity of small cell 
technologies which is enabling CSLI’s accuracy). Specifically, CSLI can show a person’s location 
within ten feet. Id. at 176. In contrast, GPS can show a person’s location within fifty feet. Id.; Stepha-
nie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward Reasonable Standards for Law 
Enforcement Access to Location Data That Congress Could Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 129 
(2012). 
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Second, the Court also distinguished Smith and Miller based on how 
“voluntary” the sharing of information with a third party truly is.87 CSLI can 
accumulate when a person is not actively using their phone, for example, when 
they receive a call, text, or email.88 Additionally, CSLI is automatically gener-
ated when apps are checking the weather or social media updates.89 As a result, 
anyone who owns a phone cannot avoid generating a log of places they have 
been.90 Moreover, owning a phone is practically mandated as a condition of 
functioning in society.91 This lack of affirmative action, the Court reasoned, is 
distinguishable from Smith and Miller.92 In Miller, the defendant affirmatively 
decided to make bank deposits and write checks.93 Likewise, in Smith, the de-
fendant actively dialed the numbers on his phone.94 Accordingly, the Court 
took a narrow view of voluntariness, explaining that someone does not volun-
tarily “assume the risk” of constant monitoring just by carrying a cellphone.95 
Because smart meter data is relayed to third parties, it is relevant to consider 
how law enforcement typically obtains data from third parties.96 
B. The Legal Standard the Government Must Satisfy to Compel Records 
Law enforcement agents typically use a subpoena or a warrant to obtain ev-
idence.97 A subpoena generally requires a showing of reasonableness, whereas a 
warrant requires a heightened showing of probable cause.98 In the case of tradi-
tional energy meters, police have been successful in using subpoenas, rather 
                                                                                                                           
 87 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220; see Bloom & Clark, supra note 61, at 196–99 (arguing that the 
third-party doctrine does not apply to CSLI because the sharing of the information with the cell phone 
provider is not truly voluntary). 
 88 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. A cellular network utilizes cell towers equipped with antennas. 
Thomas A. O’Malley, Using Historical Cell Site Analysis Evidence in Criminal Trials, U.S. ATT’Y 
BULL., Nov. 2011, at 16, 19, 27 (2011). When a person’s phone connects to a cell tower, a unique 
number identifies the phone. Id. at 20. The cell phone provider then uses this number for billing pur-
poses. Id. at 23. CSLI comprises the resulting location and identifying information. Id. 
 89 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
 90 Id. To find this data on an iPhone, a person should: (1) go to the “settings” app on the iPhone, 
(2) scroll down and tap “privacy,” (3) tap “location services” and scroll to the bottom of the screen, 
(4) tap “system services,” and (5) scroll down to “significant locations.” Fred Zahradnik, How to Find 
Your Location History in Google Maps or iPhone, LIFEWIRE (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.lifewire.
com/location-history-google-maps-iphone-1683392 [https://perma.cc/YT2D-9AXM]. 
 91 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
 94 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44. 
 95 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. The Court cautioned that their holding was narrow, only based 
on seven days of CSLI. Id. 
 96 See infra notes 97–139 and accompanying text. 
 97 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222. See generally Robert M. Bloom, Warrant Requirement—The 
Burger Court Approach, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 691 (1982) (recognizing the Burger Court’s application 
of the Katz test as a deviation from the Warren Court’s preference for the warrant requirement). 
 98 Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 806–07 (2005). 
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than warrants, to gain access to data in marijuana growing operation investiga-
tions.99 Subsection 1 of this Section discusses various standards for obtaining 
data.100 Subsection 2 demonstrates how subpoenas have been used to compel 
utility companies to provide energy data to law enforcement.101 
1. Investigative Tools: Warrants, Subpoenas, and Court Orders 
In criminal investigations, the government may use a warrant or a sub-
poena to obtain evidence.102 In most cases, when the government conducts a 
“search” under the Fourth Amendment, a warrant is required.103 A warrant au-
thorizes law enforcement officials to physically enter the place where evidence 
is believed to be and take evidence that they find.104 In contrast, when the gov-
ernment uses a subpoena, it instructs a party to provide the government with 
the requested evidence.105 The subpoena recipient must gather the evidence on 
its own and then provide it to the government.106 
An important distinction between subpoenas and warrants is that warrants 
always require a showing of probable cause, whereas subpoenas require a low-
er burden of proof.107 Probable cause exists where there is a reasonable belief 
that evidence of criminal activity will be found.108 When law enforcement 
agents use a warrant, a search occurs and a person can challenge the validity of 
                                                                                                                           
 99 See United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 689 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012) (uphold-
ing the Drug Enforcement Administration’s subpoena for energy consumption records in an investiga-
tion of illegal use and distribution of marijuana); United States v. Hoang, 487 F. App’x 239, 245 (6th 
Cir. 2012) (finding that utility records supported probable cause for the search of defendant’s home); 
McIntyre, 646 F.3d at 1111 (upholding the county attorney’s subpoena of electricity usage records in 
drug crime investigation involving marijuana). 
 100 See infra notes 102–120 and accompanying text. 
 101 See infra notes 121–139 and accompanying text. 
 102 Slobogin, supra note 98, at 810. When the government seeks records, a subpoena is generally 
the preferred mechanism. Id. 
 103 See, e.g., Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2173 (2016) (noting that police must 
obtain a warrant prior to conducting a search); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011) (“[T]his 
Court has inferred that a warrant must generally be secured.”); see also Timothy Andrea, The Exigen-
cies of Drunk Driving: Cripps v. State and the Issues with Taking Drivers’ Blood Without a Warrant, 
59 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 482, 484–85 (2018) (summarizing the warrant requirement and the exigent 
circumstances exception). 
 104 Slobogin, supra note 98, at 810; Orin Kerr, Does Carpenter Revolutionize the Law of Subpoe-
nas?, LAWFARE (June 26, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/does-carpenter-revolutionize-law-
subpoenas [https://perma.cc/G5TS-V2BV] [hereinafter Kerr, The Law of Subpoenas]. 
 105 Slobogin, supra note 98, at 810. 
 106 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2250–57 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing the history of subpoe-
nas in the United States). 
 107 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (noting that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause”); 
United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) (finding that a grand jury subpoena does 
not require probable cause “because the very purpose of requesting the information is to ascertain 
whether probable cause exists”). 
 108 BLOOM & BRODIN, supra note 37, at 121. A valid search warrant must also describe the place 
to be searched and the items sought with particularity. Id. at 123. 
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the warrant or the search on Fourth Amendment grounds.109 On the other hand, 
when law enforcement agents use a subpoena, the Fourth Amendment is not 
strongly implicated because police are not physically taking evidence.110 In-
stead, a person can challenge the subpoena on Fifth Amendment grounds, but 
this is rarely successful.111 There are two types of subpoenas that may require 
an individual to turn over evidence to law enforcement: a subpoena duces te-
cum and an administrative subpoena.112 A grand jury or prosecutor manages a 
subpoena duces tecum, which requires a suspect to appear before the court and 
produce evidence.113 A government agency, in contrast, administers an admin-
istrative subpoena.114 
The government can also seek to obtain information through a court or-
der.115 In Carpenter, for example, the government seized the defendant’s CSLI 
under the Stored Communications Act (SCA).116 The SCA authorizes the gov-
ernment to obtain information through a warrant, an administrative subpoena, 
                                                                                                                           
 109 Id. at 121. To challenge a warrant, a person can argue that police officers did not have proba-
ble cause. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 900 (1984). Alternatively, a person could argue that 
police officers exceeded the scope of the warrant. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88 (1987). To 
challenge a search based on the Fourth Amendment, a person can argue that police officers needed a 
warrant. BLOOM & BRODIN, supra note 37, at 121. To preserve the element of surprise, a warrant can 
be issued without prior notice. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 316 (1978); United States v. 
Bailey (In re Subpoena Duces Tecum), 228 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 110 Slobogin, supra note 98, at 807. 
 111 Id. at 813. Challenging a subpoena based on the Fifth Amendment is usually futile. Id. at 806. 
A person could also resist a subpoena based on burdensomeness and irrelevance. Id. Arguing that a 
subpoena is too burdensome, however, is “almost always doomed to failure.” WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET 
AL., 3 CRIM. PROC. 135 (2d ed. 1999). Challenging a subpoena because it is irrelevant is also difficult. 
Slobogin, supra note 98, at 806. For example, grand jury subpoenas are deemed irrelevant only when 
“there is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the government seeks will produce 
information relevant to the general subject of the grand jury’s investigation.” R. Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 
at 301. Similarly, there is a relatively low threshold for proving relevance in the case of administrative 
subpoenas. Slobogin, supra note 98, at 806.  
 112 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 408 (2018); Slobogin, supra note 98, 
at 805. A grand jury subpoena requires an individual to bring evidence to a grand jury proceeding. 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra, at 408. 
 113 Slobogin, supra note 97, at 805–06. 
 114 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 112, at 408. To be constitutional, administrative subpoenas 
must also only be used where the government does not already have the information and enforcing the 
subpoena will not be an abuse of the court system. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL33321, ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS: A BRIEF LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 
(2006) [hereinafter CRS ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS REPORT]. 
 115 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210 (obtaining CSLI data pursuant to a court order). See gener-
ally Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, Criminal Defendant’s Rights Under Stored Communications 
Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701 et seq., 11 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 1 (2016) (summarizing the SCA). 
 116 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210; see Orin Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications 
Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending it, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1218 (2004) (explaining 
the compelled disclosure rules in the SCA) [hereinafter Kerr, A User’s Guide to the SCA]. The SCA 
makes it illegal to access or disclose stored electronic communications records, unless the government 
compels such disclosure as allowed by the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2018). See generally Catalano, 
supra note 115 (examining a defendant’s rights under the SCA). 
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or a § 2703(d) court order.117 In Carpenter, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) used a court order, which required the government to show reasonable 
grounds for believing that the records were “relevant and material to an ongoing 
investigation.”118 This standard has been described as “a mix between a subpoe-
na and a search warrant.”119 Though warrants, subpoenas, and court orders may 
provide access to data, a subpoena has been the primary mechanism for compel-
ling the disclosure of traditional energy meter data.120 
2. Use of Subpoenas to Access Traditional Energy Meter Data 
Utility records have been an important part of law enforcement investiga-
tions involving drug crimes.121 Historically, law enforcement agents did not 
need a warrant to access energy consumption data.122 For example, in 2012, 
                                                                                                                           
 117 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
 118 Id. § 2703(d). Section 2703(d) court orders require notifying the person whose records are 
sought. Id. § 2705. The judge will issue the order if the government makes the requisite showing. 
Kerr, A User’s Guide to the SCA, supra note 116, at 1218. Once the order is issued, it is served like an 
ordinary subpoena. Id. 
 119 Kerr, A User’s Guide to the SCA, supra note 116, at 1219.  
 120 Jack I. Lerner & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Taking the “Long View” on the Fourth Amendment: 
Stored Records and the Sanctity of the Home, 2008 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 33. 
 121 See Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 689 F.3d at 1117 (upholding the Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration’s subpoena for energy consumption records in an investigation of illegal use and distribution 
of marijuana); Hoang, 487 F. App’x at 245 (concluding utility records supported probable cause for 
the search of defendant’s home); McIntyre, 646 F.3d at 1111 (upholding the county attorney’s sub-
poena of electricity usage records in drug crime investigation involving marijuana); United States v. 
Thomas, 605 F.3d 300, 306 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that utility records could refresh a ‘stale’ tip from 
a confidential informant to support probable cause); United States v. Hamilton, 434 F. Supp. 2d 974, 
987 (D. Or. 2006) (determining that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in home power 
consumption data obtained via administrative subpoena). In 1994, in United States v. Field, a deputy 
sheriff executed a subpoena duces tecum on an electricity company to obtain electric bills. 855 
F. Supp. 1518, 1523 (W.D. Wis. 1994). There, the defendant was suspected of growing marijuana and 
the sheriff sought to determine whether the defendant’s electrical use was high. Id. 
 122 Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 689 F.3d at 1117. Electric utilities may also voluntarily disclose 
electric bills to law enforcement, who can then use the information as the basis for search warrants. 
Dean Narciso, Police Seek Utility Data for Homes of Marijuana Growing Suspects, COLUMBUS DIS-
PATCH (Feb. 28, 2011), https://www.dispatch.com/article/20110228/NEWS/302289766 [https://
perma.cc/W3W2-Y2BS] (explaining that if no illegal behavior is observed at a person’s home, police 
might seek access to energy records in order to support a search warrant). Some have pondered why 
utility companies would want to report their “best customers” to law enforcement, speculating that 
utility companies might have a financial incentive to do so. The Weed Blog, Do Utilities Tell Cops 
About Marijuana Gardens with High Electricity Bills?, CANNABIS MAVEN (Jan. 29, 2012), https://
cannabismaven.io/theweedblog/policies/do-utilities-tell-cops-about-marijuana-gardens-with-high-
electricity-bills-ABXPziugNkCts8G0TwslZw/ [https://perma.cc/FX5B-F9VH]. In California, for 
example, a utility company alerted law enforcement to an abnormally high electric bill. A Suspicious 
Electric Bill?, PRIVACY.ORG (Mar. 29, 2004), https://privacy.org/archives/001250.html [https://perma.
cc/C8X3-W5PV]. Law enforcement investigated the home for involvement in marijuana production. 
Id. Ultimately, the family simply used a large amount of electricity. Id.; see Balough, supra note 5, at 
172 (noting that “there is a history of voluntary utility compliance with government requests to share 
personal consumer usage information, such as by the phone companies after 9/11”). 
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld warrantless ac-
cess to energy consumption records in United States vs. Golden Valley Electric 
Ass’n.123 In Golden Valley, the Drug Enforcement Administration subpoenaed 
electricity records of three homes.124 The utility company challenged the sub-
poena.125 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held that individuals do not have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in a business record owned by the utility compa-
ny.126 
The third-party doctrine has successfully allowed law enforcement to by-
pass the warrant requirement when investigating marijuana growers.127 For 
example, as early as 1993, the Idaho Court of Appeals applied the third-party 
doctrine in holding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to power rec-
ords.128 Power records are business records, the court reasoned, and Miller and 
Smith recognized that the Fourth Amendment did not protect business rec-
ords.129 Though the Fourth Amendment did not apply, the court proceeded to 
evaluate the privacy interest in the power records in determining whether the 
Idaho Constitution protected the records.130 To determine the privacy interest, 
the court applied the Katz test.131 The court noted that the records only re-
vealed power usage, did not identify the defendant’s activities, and did not re-
veal any intimate information.132 The court reasoned that various factors could 
                                                                                                                           
 123 Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 689 F.3d at 1117. 
 124 Id. The Drug Enforcement Administration served an administrative subpoena on Golden Val-
ley, the electric utility. Id. at 1111. Specifically, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Con-
trol Act of 1970 gives the Attorney General the authority to utilize administrative subpoenas in con-
nection with drug crime investigations. Id. at 1113 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 876(a) (2018)). 
 125 Id. at 1114.  
 126 Id. at 1116. Golden Valley asserted the Fourth Amendment claim on behalf of its consumers. 
Id. The Ninth Circuit was not convinced that Golden Valley had the authority to do so but did not 
address the question due to the third-party doctrine. Id. 
 127 McIntyre, 646 F.3d at 1111. In Golden Valley, the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly apply the 
third-party doctrine but cited to Smith and Miller in holding that a person has no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in energy consumption records. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 689 F.3d at 1117. 
 128 Idaho v. Kluss, 867 P.2d 247, 252 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993); see Hamilton, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 
980 (finding that a person has no expectation of privacy in electricity consumption records). 
 129 Kluss, 867 P.2d at 252; see Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44 (holding that a person has no reasonable 
expectation in phone records); Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (holding that a person has no reasonable expec-
tation in bank records); Couch, 409 U.S. at 340 (1973) (holding that a person has no reasonable ex-
pectation in tax records); see also Erin Murphy, The Case Against the Case for the Third Party Doc-
trine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1252 (2009) (advocating for a balancing test to determine 
whether a person forfeits privacy in records); James M. Small, Storing Documents in the Cloud: To-
ward an Evidentiary Privilege Protecting Papers and Effects Stored on the Internet, 23 GEO. MASON 
U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 255, 264–67 (2013) (discussing the third-party doctrine in connection with business 
records). 
 130 Kluss, 867 P.2d at 252. 
 131 Id. at 253. 
 132 Id. at 254. In addition, the court said that the privacy expectation is even lower in power rec-
ords than in bank or telephone records, which reveal information about a person’s activities. Id. The 
defendant relied on People v. Chapman, 679 P.2d 62 (1984), where the court determined that a person 
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cause a person to consume large amounts of power such as having a hot tub or 
poor insulation.133 Because the cause of a high power bill is not immediately 
clear from the bill itself, the court concluded that, under Katz, society would 
not reasonably recognize a person’s privacy interests in power records.134 
Similarly, in 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit upheld an administrative subpoena used to obtain electricity usage records 
based on the third-party doctrine in United States v. McIntyre.135 In McIntyre, 
the defendant argued that a warrant was required to access his energy records 
because it revealed “intimate details about the interior of his home.”136 Name-
ly, the defendant relied on Kyllo to argue that the inference made from the en-
ergy consumption record was the same inference that was made in Kyllo: high-
energy usage is consistent with a marijuana grow light.137 The Eight Circuit, 
however, found that police use of a thermal image device in Kyllo was differ-
ent than merely asking the utility company for records.138 Put differently, be-
cause the electricity records were compelled via a subpoena, and the infor-
mation was not gathered directly by law enforcement, there was significantly 
less intrusion into a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.139 
                                                                                                                           
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unlisted phone number. Kluss, 867 P.2d at 253. In 
Chapman, the defendant paid an extra fee to the telephone company to obtain an unlisted telephone 
number. 679 P.2d at 68. There, the court held that the “disclosure of the subscriber’s name and ad-
dress may well add the missing link to make up a ‘virtual current biography.’” Id. at 68–69 (quoting 
Burrows, 529 P.2d at 596 (1974)). The court in Kluss, however, distinguished Chapman on the 
grounds that electric utility records did not “provide or complete a ‘virtual current biography.’” Kluss, 
867 P.2d at 253–54. 
 133 Kluss, 867 P.2d at 254. 
 134 Id. 
 135 McIntyre, 646 F.3d at 1111. An administrative subpoena can be challenged on the grounds 
that it is “too indefinite or broad.” Peters v. United States, 853 F.2d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). Ulti-
mately, an administrative subpoena will be upheld if (1) Congress has granted the administration the 
authority to investigate; (2) appropriate procedures were followed; and (3) the evidence sought is 
relevant to an ongoing investigation. Investigation and Police Practices, Overview of the Fourth 
Amendment, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 3, 114–16 (2006). The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit has held that a “Fourth Amendment ‘reasonableness’ inquiry must also be satisfied” 
when evaluating an administrative subpoena. Reich v. Mont. Sulphur & Chem. Co., 32 F.3d 440, 444 
n.5 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 136 McIntyre, 646 F.3d at 1111. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id.; see United States v. Starkweather, No. 91-30354, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 20207, at *4 (9th 
Cir. Aug. 24, 1992) (finding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in electric utility rec-
ords because the records were similar to bank and phone records). 
 139 McIntyre, 646 F.3d at 1111; see Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting) (explain-
ing that there is a “basic distinction between an actual search . . . and an order merely requiring a party 
to look through its own records and produce specified documents” and that “[t]he former, which in-
trudes on personal privacy far more deeply, requires probable cause,” and “the latter does not”). 
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II. CARPENTER’S RECOGNITION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN 
RECORDS HELD BY A THIRD PARTY 
This Part discusses the 2018 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Carpenter v. 
United States.140 Section A of this Part explains how third-party storage of data 
resulted in a Fourth Amendment void pre-Carpenter.141 Section B summarizes 
the facts and holding of Carpenter.142 Section C explains how Carpenter re-
solved the gap in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by requiring law enforce-
ment to obtain a warrant prior to requesting data held by a third party.143 
A. Pre-Carpenter Confusion: What Legal Standard Governs Access to 
Records Stored by a Third Party in Which a Person Has  
Fourth Amendment Rights? 
The standard to apply when law enforcement seeks to obtain remotely 
stored records in which a person has Fourth Amendment rights was unclear 
prior to Carpenter.144 To obtain evidence stored with a third party, law en-
forcement could use a warrant or a subpoena.145 Using a warrant in this way, 
however, is impractical.146 A warrant enables police to storm into a company’s 
headquarters and search company servers to obtain information on just one 
individual.147 This non-sensical approach is often unnecessary because third 
party providers are generally willing to turn over the data.148 
                                                                                                                           
 140 See infra notes 143–184 and accompanying text. 
 141 See infra notes 144–157 and accompanying text. 
 142 See infra notes 158–172 and accompanying text. 
 143 See infra notes 171–185 and accompanying text. 
 144 Kerr, The Law of Subpoenas, supra note 104; see United States v. Barr, 605 F. Supp. 114, 119 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (upholding initial warrant to access mail box, and subsequently upholding a subpoe-
na to compel an individual to hand over the documents in the mail box). In Barr, the court left open 
the question of whether a subpoena could be used to open the documents in the mailbox without the 
need for a warrant. Id.; Kerr, The Law of Subpoenas, supra note 104. In other cases, the court held that 
a warrant is required to access data. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that a user has Fourth Amendment rights in the contents of their remotely stored email and 
therefore a warrant is required); United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1066 n.1 (8th Cir. 2002) (not-
ing, that the court “analyze[s] this case [about access to remotely stored emails] under the search war-
rant standard, not under the subpoena standard”); Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 454 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(requiring a warrant to access medical records); Louisiana v. Skinner, 10 So. 3d 1212, 1213 (La. 
2009) (holding that a warrant is necessary to access prescription records). But see Commonwealth v. 
Riedel, 651 A.2d 135, 140 (Pa. 1994) (holding that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
medical records and requiring a showing of probable cause but not requiring a warrant).  
 145 Slobogin, supra note 98, at 806; Kerr, The Law of Subpoenas, supra note 104. 
 146 Kerr, The Law of Subpoenas, supra note 104. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
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Law enforcement traditionally use a subpoena to access data held by third 
parties.149 If a person has Fourth Amendment rights in the data to be seized, 
however, the use of a subpoena would render those Fourth Amendment rights 
meaningless.150 Law enforcement could simply subpoena records without sat-
isfying the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement.151 Moreover, a 
person could not challenge the subpoena based on the Fifth Amendment because 
the records are kept with a third party.152 So, the use of a subpoena to access 
such records allows law enforcement to bypass Fourth Amendment rights and 
leaves people unprotected by the Fifth Amendment.153 
Before Carpenter, courts had rarely addressed this issue due to the third-
party doctrine.154 The third-party doctrine recognizes that a person does not 
have Fourth Amendment rights in certain records.155 Therefore, without first 
recognizing that a person has Fourth Amendment rights, it is unnecessary to 
decide the standard needed to gain access to data in which a person has such 
rights.156 This is the issue that the Supreme Court confronted in Carpenter.157 
                                                                                                                           
 149 Id.; see supra notes 121–139 and accompanying text. Additionally, by subpoenaing a record 
from a third party, police could avoid the risk that a person might destroy the record. A.B.A. STAND-
ARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS 4 (2012). 
 150 Kerr, The Law of Subpoenas, supra note 104. 
 151 Id. 
 152 See generally Robert P. Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth Amendment 
Seriously, 73 VA. L. REV. 1 (1987) (explaining that third parties have “constructive possession” of 
records, and as such are not subject to the Fifth Amendment). In 1976, in Fisher v. United States, the 
Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination did not protect against 
a subpoena for tax records. 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976). One commentator has interpreted Fisher as 
creating a “framework of a new system in which the availability of the privilege turns, apparently 
exclusively, upon whether the act of production involves testimonial self-incrimination.” Mosteller, 
supra, at 5. 
 153 Kerr, The Law of Subpoenas, supra note 104. The Supreme Court recognized this conundrum 
in SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc. 467 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1984). There, the Court explained: 
[A] person inculpated by materials sought by a subpoena issued to a third party cannot 
seek shelter in the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment . . . . It is estab-
lished that, when a person communicates information to a third party even on the un-
derstanding that the communication is confidential, he cannot object if the third party 
conveys that information or records thereof to law enforcement authorities. 
Id. at 742–43. 
 154 Kerr, The Law of Subpoenas, supra note 104; see Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 
2555 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that “the reason that we have never seen such a case is be-
cause—until today—defendants categorically had no ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ and no prop-
erty interest in records belonging to third parties”). 
 155 Kerr, The Law of Subpoenas, supra note 104. 
 156 See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Orin S. Kerr at 15–26, United States v. Bach, 
310 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-1238) (urging the court to consider whether the Fourth 
Amendment should be evaluated under search warrant precedents or subpoena precedents). 
 157 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222. 
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B. Facts and Holding of Carpenter v. United States 
In Carpenter, the FBI suspected several men of committing group rob-
beries in Michigan and Ohio.158 To prove that Timothy Carpenter, one of the 
suspects, was near the stores when the crimes occurred, the FBI sought Car-
penter’s cell phone records.159 Specifically, the FBI applied for a § 2703(d) 
order under the SCA and requested CSLI for a four-month period.160 CLSI is 
generated every time a phone connects to a cell-site, which may happen sever-
al times per minute even if a person is not using their phone.161 The CSLI tak-
en from Carpenter’s phone confirmed that Carpenter was near the stores at the 
exact time the robberies took place.162 Determining whether the government’s 
request for CSLI constituted a Fourth Amendment search, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied the third-party doctrine and held that cell 
phone records were business records not entitled to Fourth Amendment protec-
tions.163 The Supreme Court reversed, finding that a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in CSLI.164 
Recognizing that CSLI data requires a warrant, Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts, Jr., writing for the majority, emphasized that CSLI provides a com-
plete record of a person’s travel history.165 Evaluating the intrusiveness of the 
data, he highlighted that “time-stamped data provides an intimate window into 
                                                                                                                           
 158 Id. at 2212. Police officers arrested four men for robbing Radio Shack and T-Mobile stores in 
Detroit, Michigan. Id. One of the men implicated fifteen accomplices and provided the FBI with their 
cell phone numbers. Id. 
 159 Id. After obtaining the CSLI from MetroPCS and Sprint, the government amassed 12,989 
location points showing Carpenter’s movements. Id. This is the equivalent of 101 location data points 
per day. Id. 
 160 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2018); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212; see supra note 120 and accompa-
nying text (explaining that a § 2703(d) order is a court order that functions like a subpoena); supra 
notes 116–120 and accompanying text (discussing the Stored Communications Act (SCA)). See gen-
erally Catalano, supra note 115 (explaining a defendant’s rights under the SCA). 
 161 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. In addition, seven of Carpenter’s accomplices testified that he 
was the “leader.” Id. at 2212. 
 162 Id. at 2213; see Bloom & Clark, supra note 61, at 174–76 (discussing the science behind CSLI 
and the nature of the data). Specifically, CSLI can show a person’s location within ten feet. Id. at 176. 
When a person’s phone connects to a cell tower, it “pings,” and a unique number identifies it. 
O’Malley, supra note 88, at 22–23. Cell phone providers then use this number to bill the user but links 
the person to the place the phone was when it pinged. Id. at 23. Cell-sites can be found on cell towers, 
light posts, flagpoles, or even on sides of buildings. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211. Moreover, wireless 
carriers have installed more cell-sites to keep up with cell phone usage data. Id. at 2212. Naturally, 
with more cell-sites, it is easier to narrow down a person’s location. Bloom & Clark, supra note 61, at 
175. 
 163 United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 889 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that CSLI are “business 
records obtained from a third party, which can only diminish the defendants’ expectation of privacy in 
the information those records contain”). 
 164 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223. 
 165 Id. at 2217. 
2020] Smart Meter Data Post-Carpenter 807 
a person’s life.”166 Additionally, the majority pointed out that everyone has 
CSLI, not just those under investigation.167 As a result, the government can 
essentially time-travel to track a person’s past movements.168 The Court ex-
plained that the only limit on collecting this data is the retention period im-
posed by cell phone carriers, which is typically five years.169 Moreover, the 
Court found the large quantity of data points and the precision of the data to 
warrant a heightened privacy interest.170 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held 
that the government conducts a search for Fourth Amendment purposes when 
it collects an individual’s CSLI.171 The next issue the Court addressed was the 
legal standard required for government access to records in which a person has 
Fourth Amendment rights.172 
C. The Subpoena Analysis in Carpenter v. United States 
In Carpenter, law enforcement obtained the defendant’s cell-site data pur-
suant to a court order authorized by the SCA.173 The Court held that the SCA’s 
requirement that the information was “relevant and material to an ongoing inves-
tigation” was too far below the probable cause standard required by the Fourth 
Amendment.174 Ultimately, the Court held that, just as in a local search, seeking 
access to information in which a person retains Fourth Amendment rights re-
quires a warrant.175 
                                                                                                                           
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. at 2218. The Court distinguished this situation from the one in United States v. Jones, 
where police attached a GPS tracking device to the defendant’s car. Id. In Jones, the Court found the 
attachment of a GPS device to the defendant’s car to be a search. 565 U. S. 400, 402 (2012). Notably, 
Justice Sotomayor joined the majority opinion, but wrote separately to express the dangers of location 
tracking. Id. at 413–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor noted that GPS data was “a 
precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about 
her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.” Id. at 415. 
 168 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210. 
 169 Id. at 2218. In Jones, Justice Sotomayor expressed concerns over the fact that GPS data can be 
held indefinitely. 565 U. S. 400 at 412 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 170 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219. Specifically, CSLI can generate hundreds of data points that 
each pinpoint a person’s location within 50 meters. Id. 
 171 Id. at 2220. This is true at least when the CSLI meets the facts of Carpenter where a warrant 
was required to obtain more than six days of CSLI records. See id. (cautioning that the Court’s hold-
ing “is a narrow one”). 
 172 Id. at 2221. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. According to the dissent’s characterization of the majority’s view, the Court held that “the 
Government crosses a constitutional line when it obtains a court’s approval to issue a subpoena for 
more than six days of cell-site records in order to determine whether a person was within several hun-
dred city blocks of a crime scene.” Id. at 2224. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 175 See id. at 2221 (majority opinion) (noting that the “Government’s obligation is a familiar 
one—get a warrant”). But see United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930) (noting that 
“the real evil aimed at by the Fourth Amendment is the search itself, that invasion of a man’s privacy 
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In his dissent, Justice Alito wrote that the warrant requirement should not 
apply when the government seeks to obtain records using a subpoena, which 
makes use of a reasonableness standard.176 Justice Alito found the fact that 
records are stored with a third party to be significant.177 Specifically, he assert-
ed that the risk of intrusion on privacy is much lower when records are being 
compelled than when they are being physically taken, as is the case with a typ-
ical search of the home.178 Ultimately, Justice Alito noted that only cases of 
actual searches and seizures had ever invoked the warrant requirement.179 Put 
differently, Justice Alito emphasized that there is a legally significant differ-
ence between law enforcement officials asking for records and law enforce-
ment officials physically collecting the records.180 
In response to Justice Alito, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that CSLI 
is fundamentally different than other types of business records traditionally 
subject to a subpoena.181 Moreover, the majority reasoned that the subpoena’s 
reasonableness requirement is not enough to safeguard Fourth Amendment 
rights because law enforcement agents could subpoena records “for no reason 
other than ‘official curiosity.’”182 In sum, the Court held that if there is a con-
stitutionally protectable privacy interest in records held by a third party, a war-
rant is required.183 But this is a “rare case,” according to the Court.184 Nonethe-
                                                                                                                           
which consists in rummaging about among his effects to secure evidence against him”) (emphasis 
added). 
 176 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2250–57 (Alito, J., dissenting); see Marty Lederman, Carpenter’s Curi-
osities (and its Potential to Unsettle Longstanding Fourth Amendment Doctrines), BALKINIZATION (June 
26, 2018), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/06/carpenter-s-curiosities-and-its.html [https://perma.cc/
2J4F-4PFW] (noting that Justice Alito spent seventeen pages discussing the differences between a 
subpoena and a warrant). 
 177 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2250–57 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 178 Id. at 2251–52. Justice Alito quoted Justice Brandeis, who was known to advocate for a liberal 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 2251. See generally Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, 
at 195 (discussing the “right to be let alone”). Notably, Justice Brandeis found that “there is no 
‘search’ or ‘seizure’ when a defendant is required to produce a document in the orderly process of a 
court’s procedure.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 476 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 179 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2254 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 180 Id. at 2251–52. By applying the warrant requirement to constructive searches, or searches that 
do not require a physical intrusion, Justice Alito characterized the majority’s holding as “revolution-
ary” and ignorant of “more than a century of Supreme Court precedent.” Id. at 2247. 
 181 Id. at 2222 (majority opinion). Justice Roberts noted that “CSLI is an entirely different species 
of business record—something that implicates basic Fourth Amendment concerns about arbitrary 
government power much more directly than corporate tax or payroll ledgers.” Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. Carpenter left unanswered many questions about how a warrant would be effectuated in 
practice. See Kerr, The Law of Subpoenas, supra note 104 (finding that it might be difficult to apply 
the warrant requirement when a third party is holding the data). For example, Orin Kerr asks whether 
the burden is on the third party to determine whether a subpoena is asking for information in which a 
person has Fourth Amendment rights. Id. 
 184 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222. 
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less, courts are now free to examine whether smart meter data is a “rare case” 
envisioned by the Court in Carpenter.185 
III. SMART METER DATA AND NAPERVILLE SMART METER  
AWARENESS V. CITY OF NAPERVILLE 
In 2018, in Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a public utili-
ty’s collection of smart meter data is a reasonable search under the Fourth 
Amendment.186 Notably, the Seventh Circuit highlighted that smart meter data 
can reveal significant information about what activities occur inside a person’s 
home.187 This Part explains the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Naperville.188 
Section A of this Part discusses smart meter data and what it can reveal about a 
person’s activities in the home.189 Section B summarizes Naperville’s holding 
that smart meter data is protected by the Fourth Amendment.190 Section C dis-
cusses Naperville in connection with the third-party doctrine.191 
                                                                                                                           
 185 See supra notes 158–184 and accompanying text. 
 186 Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 529 (7th Cir. 2018). 
The lower court, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, dismissed the Fourth 
Amendment claim. Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 69 F. Supp. 3d 830, 841 (N.D. Ill. 
2014) (Naperville I). The court held that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in smart me-
ter data and thus, the data was not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. Id. The court reasoned 
that because the data resulted in inferences that someone walking on the sidewalk could have made, 
there was no reasonable privacy interest. Id. Specifically, the court noted that if peak usage was shown 
around 7:00 pm: 
At most, someone inspecting the data might guess that at least one resident had been 
home at 7:00 pm. But that same guess could also be reasonably made by any member 
of the public walking by the residence who notices a car in the driveway or lights in the 
windows—that is not information that can be reasonably expected to remain private. 
Id. 
 187 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 526. Specifically, the court looked at studies demonstrating the types 
of information that smart meter data can reveal. Id. at 526 n.5. Orin Kerr criticized the Naperville 
court for accepting the conclusions of the studies as true despite the lack of evidence in the court rec-
ord. Orin Kerr, Public Utility’s Recording of Home Energy Consumption Every 15 Minutes Is a 
‘Search,’ Seventh Circuit Rules, LAWFARE (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/public-
utilitys-recording-home-energy-consumption-every-15-minutes-search-seventh-circuit-rules [https://
perma.cc/2VJG-LK2J] [hereinafter Kerr, Seventh Circuit Rules]. 
 188 See infra notes 192–247 and accompanying text. 
 189 See infra notes 192–218 and accompanying text. 
 190 See infra notes 219–238 and accompanying text. 
 191 See infra notes 239–247 and accompanying text. 
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A. Smart Meter Data 
Smart meters are quickly finding their way into homes throughout the 
United States.192 Today, smart meters are installed in nearly half of all homes 
in the United States, and the U.S. Energy Information Administration expects 
that eighty percent of homes will have smart meters by 2020.193 Though these 
numbers seem high, many people already have smart meters in their homes 
without knowing it.194 This is because, like traditional meters, homeowners 
generally do not interact with smart meters.195 The meters are simply there to 
“collect, measure, and analyze energy consumption data for grid management, 
outage notification, and billing purposes.”196 
Smart meters record consumer electricity usage in real time.197 This data 
is then transmitted to the utility company.198 To be useful to the utility compa-
ny, smart meter data must be granular.199 As a result, the data can reveal what 
                                                                                                                           
 192 See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Nearly Half of All U.S. Electricity Customers Have Smart Me-
ters, EIA (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=34012 [https://perma.cc/
3ZAY-7DBV] (noting that “[i]nstallations of smart meters have more than doubled since 2010”). 
 193 Id. In the United Kingdom, the government aims for every citizen to have a smart meter by 
2020, with an option to opt out of installation. GOV.UK, Smart Meters: A Guide (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/smart-meters-how-they-work [https://perma.cc/X8N8-BXEN ]. The UK 
has adopted the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which provides the “world’s strongest 
data protection rules.” Matt Burgess, What Is GDPR? The Summary Guide to GDPR Compliance in 
the UK, WIRED (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/what-is-gdpr-uk-eu-legislation-
compliance-summary-fines-2018 [https://perma.cc/5MT6-3TVK]. In countries that adopt the GDPR, 
utility companies that offer smart meters must meet the stringent standards set forth by the GDPR. 
Frost & Sullivan, Impact of General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on Smart Meters and Smart 
Pumps (Apr. 4, 2018), https://ww2.frost.com/frost-perspectives/impact-of-general-data-protection-
regulation-gdpr-on-smart-meters-and-smart-pumps/ [https://perma.cc/4EA2-UH5V]. 
 194 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., supra note 192. In 2015, only about half of households with a 
smart meter reported that they either did not have one or did not know if they had one. Id.; see, e.g., 
Sandra Chianfoni et al., Petition: Halt Massachusetts Smart Meter Program, CHANGE.ORG, https://
www.change.org/p/halt-massachusetts-smart-meter-program [https://perma.cc/PQY9-XN3K] (indicat-
ing that utility companies have “installed wireless and smart meters without . . . consent”). Some state 
legislatures have responded to these privacy concerns by enacting or attempting to enact bills that 
would allow customers to opt out of smart meter data installation. See S. Bill 7214 (N.Y. 2018) (estab-
lishing the right to opt out when a utility company seeks to replace a traditional meter with a smart 
meter and making it illegal for a company to “install any two-way smart meter device . . . without [a] 
customer’s consent”). 
 195 DEP’T OF ENERGY, COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS OF SMART GRID TECHNOLOGIES 1 
(2010) [hereinafter DEP’T OF ENERGY REPORT]. When smart meters are used in buildings, building 
managers can monitor the performance of the smart meter in real-time. SIEMENS, SMART ENERGY 
CONSUMPTION AND THE SMART GRID 3 (2010). 
 196 DEP’T OF ENERGY REPORT, supra note 195. 
 197 See CRS SMART METER REPORT, supra note 6, at 3 (noting that the collection of data every 
fifteen seconds results in data being practically recorded in “real-time”). 
 198 Id. Specifically, the data can be transmitted via fiber optic networks, wireless networks, satel-
lite, and power lines. Id. at 6. 
 199 Id. at 1–2. 
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appliances a consumer is using and at what time.200 Every appliance in a per-
son’s home has an electric load signature that is unique to that appliance.201 By 
comparing smart meter data and electric load signatures, it is possible to identi-
fy what appliances a person is using at a given time.202 If this data is aggregat-
ed over time, it could reveal a person’s daily home life.203 For example, smart 
meter data could show that a person is not home every Saturday morning from 
9:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.204 It could show that a person typically goes to sleep at 
10:00 p.m.205 It could show that a person cooks dinner three times per week.206 
If a person has visitors for the weekend, smart meter data can show that, too.207 
The granularity of smart meter data is necessary to realize the benefits of 
smart meters.208 Specifically, this data enables smart meters to generate time-
based pricing, where a utility company can charge higher prices when there is 
higher demand for electricity.209 For example, electricity might cost more at 
5:00 p.m. when most people go home after work, but might be cheaper at 3:00 
                                                                                                                           
 200 NIST SMART GRID REPORT, supra note 7, at 10–11. An Italian study identified “heavy-load 
appliance uses” with ninety percent accuracy using fifteen-minute interval data from a smart meter. 
ELIAS LEAK QUINN, SMART METERING & PRIVACY: EXISTING LAW AND COMPETING POLICES: A 
REPORT FOR THE COLORADO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 3 n.7 (2008). 
 201 NIST SMART GRID REPORT, supra note 7, at 10–11. The technique used to determine which 
appliances are present in the home is referred to as a nonintrusive appliance load monitoring (NALM) 
technique. Id. at 10. NALM techniques have been used to monitor energy demand and usage. Id. at 
11. This information can be helpful to utility companies who can use the data to increase energy effi-
ciency. Id. 
 202 CRS SMART METER REPORT, supra note 6, at 4. 
 203 NIST SMART GRID REPORT, supra note 7, at 11. The smart meter itself, however, only 
measures total energy consumption in fifteen-minute intervals. Id. at 9. To identify appliances and 
usage patterns, the data must be compared against other information. Id. at 11. 
 204 See id. at 28 (noting that “[a]ccess to data-use profiles that can reveal specific times and loca-
tions of electricity use in specific areas of the home can also indicate the types of activities and/or 
appliances used”). 
 205 See id. at 28 n.71 (explaining that smart meter data can reveal that a toaster was used at 8:00 
am, 10:00 am, and 12:00 pm). 
 206 See id. at 34 (providing that “appliance usage data could indicate how often meals are cooked 
with the microwave, the stove, or not cooked at all, as well as implying the frequency of meals”). 
 207 See id. at 29 (explaining how smart meter data can uncover how many people are in the 
home). 
 208 CRS SMART METER REPORT, supra note 6, at 1–2. 
 209 SIEMENS, supra note 195, at 7. If there was a breach of smart meter data, criminals could find 
out when homes are unoccupied, or may use the data to stalk victims. McKenna et al., supra note 22, 
at 808. Smart meter data could also be sold to third parties. See id. (providing that commercial uses of 
smart meter data raise privacy concerns). For example, utility companies could sell the smart meter 
data to Samsung, which might purchase such data and use it to inform a potential customer that their 
current refrigerator is inefficient and that they should buy a new refrigerator from Samsung. See id. 
(noting that targeted advertising is a privacy concern of smart meter data). Additionally, smart meter 
data might be used in a custody battle to determine whether a child was left home alone. Id. Likewise, 
a landlord might use smart meter data to determine that there are too many occupants living in a 
home. Id. The data could also be used to monitor a spouse’s behavior, such as determining whether 
one spouse was home alone all week when the other spouse was away. See id. (noting that “partners 
investigating each other’s behavior” is a privacy concern resulting from smart meter data). 
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a.m. when most people are sleeping.210 The time-stamped data is therefore 
necessary to alert the utility company to the times when people consume the 
most electricity.211 Moreover, smart meters can collect data from a smart grid 
to monitor these real-time energy prices.212 
In addition, because of the unreliability of the current electrical grid, the 
installation of smart meters has become a priority for the national govern-
ment.213 Additionally, smart meters can help contribute to a greener environ-
ment by reducing the consumption of fossil fuel resources.214 This is because 
smart meters can provide detailed feedback to homeowners about their habits 
to help change consumer behavior and reduce costs.215 Detailed feedback is 
also provided to utility companies to allow the company to react quickly in the 
case of a blackout.216 Furthermore, utility companies can instruct smart meters 
to alter a consumer’s electricity usage.217 Lastly, smart meters are often cheap-
er than traditional meters, which incentivizes the adoption of smart meters for 
both utility companies and consumers.218 
                                                                                                                           
 210 See U.S. Dep’t of Energy Office of Elec. Delivery & Energy Reliability, Time Based Rate 
Programs, SMARTGRID.GOV (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.smartgrid.gov/recovery_act/time_based_
rate_programs.html [https://perma.cc/NZM4-JGW8] (discussing several forms of time-based pricing 
rates: time-of-use pricing, real-time pricing, variable peak pricing, critical peak pricing, and critical 
peak rebates). 
 211 See id. (explaining that the frequency of data collection enables time-based pricing). 
 212 Id. 
 213 See 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (2018) (authorizing federal funding for smart grid investment); U.S. 
Dep’t of Energy Office of Elec. Delivery & Energy Reliability, supra note 210 (noting that the “pro-
gram is aimed to accelerate the modernization of the nation’s electric transmission and distribution 
systems”); U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, AMI REPORT, supra note 9, at 4 (noting that the Smart Grid In-
vestment Program tested 16.3 million smart meters); see also Brendan Cook et al., The Smart Meter 
and a Smarter Consumer: Quantifying the Benefits of Smart Meter Implementation in the United 
States, CHEMISTRY CENT. J. 1, 1 (2012) (summarizing the major problems of the current electrical 
grid resulting from antiquated technology). 
 214 SIEMENS, supra note 195, at 80. But see David O. Carpenter, Smart Meters: Correcting the 
Gross Misinformation, LA MAISON (June 11, 2012), https://maisonsaine.ca/actualites/smart-meters-
correcting-the-gross-misinformation.html [https://perma.cc/C85X-VJSW] (finding potential health 
risks associated with smart meters such as increased cancer rates). 
 215 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, AMI REPORT, supra note 9, at 28. In 2012, the Oklahoma Gas and 
Electric Project reported that ninety-nine percent of customers saved money when they installed smart 
meters. Id. at 32. On average, residential customers saved $191.78 per year while commercial custom-
ers saved $570.02 per year. Id. But see Paul Hyde, ‘Shocking’ Electricity Bills Spark Concern About 
Smart Meters in the Upstate, but Duke Says They’re Accurate, GREENVILLE NEWS (Apr. 30, 2018), 
https://www.greenvilleonline.com/story/news/2018/04/30/shocking-electricity-bills-spark-concern-
smart-meters-upstate-but-duke-says-theyre-accurate/554708002/ [https://perma.cc/PD86-889Q] (de-
scribing the stories of customers who experienced an increase in electric bills after adopting smart 
meters). 
 216 NIST SMART GRID REPORT, supra note 7, at 4. 
 217 Id. 
 218 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, AMI REPORT, supra note 9, at 28. 
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B. Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville’s Recognition 
of Fourth Amendment Rights in Smart Meter Data 
Prior to the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Naperville, there was practically 
no guidance by courts on the Fourth Amendment consequences of the collec-
tion of smart meter data.219 The City of Naperville received funds from the 
U.S. Department of Energy to update the city’s electrical grid.220 This non-
investigatory use of smart meter data by the government implicated the Fourth 
Amendment.221 The smart meter installation in Naperville was mandatory; res-
idents could not opt out.222 Naperville Smart Meter Awareness, a group of con-
cerned citizens, sued Naperville alleging Fourth Amendment violations.223 
The Seventh Circuit found that the smart meter data collected at fifteen-
minute intervals was a search.224 The court compared smart meter data to the 
thermal images in Kyllo and found that smart meters were much more intru-
                                                                                                                           
 219 See CRS SMART METER REPORT, supra note 6, at 8 (noting that “there is no Fourth Amend-
ment case on point”). See generally Balough, supra note 5, at 160, 183–85 (discussing the Fourth 
Amendment’s application to smart meters); Duarte, supra note 5, at 1153–56 (analyzing the Fourth 
Amendment’s applicability to smart meters). But see Detroit Edison Co. v. Stenman, 875 N.W.2d 767, 
778 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that there was no government action that would implicate the 
Fourth Amendment when smart meters were placed without consent by a privately-owned electric 
utility). 
 220 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 524. Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the 
Department of Energy must allocate funds to different cities across the nation in exchange for in-
stalling smart meters. 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (2018); Naperville, 900 F.3d at 524. 
 221 See Naperville, 900 F.3d at 529 (noting that the public utility did not have an investigatory 
purpose in collecting the data); United States v. Attson, 900 F.2d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting 
that the Supreme Court rarely hears cases about the Fourth Amendment in the situation where there is 
“noncriminal non-investigatory governmental conduct”). 
 222 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 524. This is unlike other cities, which have allowed residents to opt-out of 
the program. See, e.g., Vickie Aldous, Opting Out of ‘Smart Meters’ Could Cost Ashland Residents, 
MAIL TRIB. (June 9, 2012), https://mailtribune.com/archive/opting-out-of-smart-meters-could-cost-
ashland-residents [https://perma.cc/JXP7-VESK] (discussing the expenses associated with one city’s 
opt-out); Christian Hill, After Public Input, Oregon Utility Offers Smart Meter Opt-Out Policy, GOV’T 
TECH. (Feb. 8, 2018), http://www.govtech.com/data/After-Public-Input-Oregon-Utility-Offers-Smart-
Meter-Opt-Out-Policy.html [https://perma.cc/H4P8-AQ2N] (explaining Oregon’s smart meter opt-out 
policy). 
 223 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 524. The citizens also alleged a violation of a similar provision in the 
Illinois Constitution. Id. Initially, the citizens argued that the fact that they were unable to retain their 
analog meters was a violation of their equal protection rights. Naperville I, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 842. The 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, however, granted summary judgment to the 
city because the citizens were unable to prove that the city allowed some citizens to keep their analog 
meters but not others. Id. 
 224 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 529. Similar to Carpenter, the Seventh Circuit cautioned that the hold-
ing was narrowly limited to data collected at fifteen-minute intervals. Id.; see Carpenter v. United 
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (explicitly noting that the holding was limited to seven days of 
cell-site location information). If the data was collected at intervals shorter than fifteen minutes or 
made more accessible to parties outside the utility, the court noted that their “conclusion could 
change.” Naperville, 900 F.3d at 529. 
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sive.225 Compared to Kyllo, where the technology revealed that something was 
emitting a large amount of energy, smart meter data can reveal “when people are 
home, when people are away, when people sleep and eat, what types of appli-
ances are in the home, and when those appliances are used.”226 Additionally, 
the court reasoned that the inference made in Kyllo, that high energy readings 
correlate to growing marijuana, could easily be made by smart meter data.227 
The Seventh Circuit noted that a search does not occur when technology 
is “widely available and routinely used by the public,” as set forth in Kyllo.228 
Without more, the court noted that the meters “have been adopted only by a 
portion of a highly specialized industry.”229 Therefore, the court found that the 
“general public use” exception did not apply to smart meters.230 Although the 
Seventh Circuit found that smart meter data collection was a search, the court 
found that the search was reasonable.231 Because there was no law enforce-
ment action, the court used a reasonableness balancing inquiry rather than the 
traditional probable cause inquiry used for warrants.232 To determine reasona-
bleness, the court weighed a person’s privacy interests in smart meter data 
against the legitimate government interest in collecting that data.233 Even 
though the court recognized that individuals have a privacy interest in their 
                                                                                                                           
 225 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 526.  
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. Moreover, the court noted that, by using NALM techniques to correlate a grow light’s 
energy consumption signature and the energy consumption pattern of a home, the inference is even 
stronger than that in Kyllo. Id.; see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001) (describing a law 
enforcement agent’s use of a high thermal energy reading to support the fact a person was growing 
marijuana in his home). But see United States v. McIntyre, 646 F.3d 1107, 1111 (8th Cir. 2011) (re-
jecting the proposition that just because the same inference was made in Kyllo, high energy meter 
readings do not warrant Fourth Amendment protection because there is a difference between physical-
ly using a thermal imaging device and asking a third-party for energy records). 
 228 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 527; see Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (indicating that the use of a technology 
is not a search when the technology is generally used by the public). 
 229 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 527. This part of the decision has been widely criticized because the 
Seventh Circuit does not point to any facts regarding how many people have smart meters. Bernard Bell, 
Too Smart by Half: Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & 
COMMENT BLOG (Nov. 6, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/too-smart-by-half-naperville-smart-meter-
awareness-v-city-of-naperville/ [https://perma.cc/TD98-RW99]. Instead, the court seems to rely more on 
“judicial intuition.” Kerr, Seventh Circuit Rules, supra note 187. 
 230 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 527. 
 231 Id. The general presumption is that a warrantless search is unreasonable. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 42. 
 232 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 528. The court also discussed the administrative search doctrine. Id. 
The administrative search doctrine recognizes that the government conducts searches without requir-
ing probable cause. Eve B. Primus, Bringing Clarity to Administrative Search Doctrine: Distinguish-
ing Dragnets from Special Subpopulation Searches, 39 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 61, 62 (2012). For 
example, administrative searches are those typically done at an airport or at public schools. Id. at 61. 
To determine whether an administrative search is reasonable, a court must weigh the government’s 
interest in carrying out the search and the invasion of a person’s privacy. Id. Accordingly, an adminis-
trative search does not require a heightened showing of probable cause. Id. at 62. 
 233 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 528. 
2020] Smart Meter Data Post-Carpenter 815 
energy consumption data, the court found the collection of smart meter data to 
be much less intrusive than typical Fourth Amendment searches.234 
Holding that the search was reasonable, the Seventh Circuit emphasized 
that the search was not associated with law enforcement and thus presented no 
risk of criminal consequences for individuals.235 In addition, the court found 
that Naperville’s “Smart Grid Customer Bill of Rights,” which clarifies that the 
public utility will not provide customer data to third parties, was a sufficient 
safeguard against further dissemination of smart meter data.236 Ultimately, the 
strong government interest in smart meters and the benefits of such meters 
outweighed the citizen’s privacy interests.237 Importantly, because Naperville 
did not involve law enforcement access to the data, the court did not apply the 
third-party doctrine.238 
C. The Third-Party Doctrine 
The City of Naperville argued that, under the third-party doctrine, citizens 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in smart meter data.239 Specifically, 
the City argued that citizens give up their expectation of privacy in energy data 
when they purchase electricity from the City.240 The Seventh Circuit, however, 
refused to apply the third-party doctrine because there was no third party: the 
data flowed directly from the citizen to the government in the form of a public 
utility.241 The court found that even if a public utility could be considered a 
                                                                                                                           
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. The court mentioned the fact that a public utility does not have prosecutorial intent when 
collecting and reviewing the data. Id. The court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in 1967 in 
Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco. Id. In Camara, building inspectors conducted a search 
under the Fourth Amendment when they entered the defendant’s building. 387 U.S. 523, 526 (1967). 
There, the Court emphasized the fact that by refusing entry to the building inspector, the defendant 
could be prosecuted under a state law that made it a crime to refuse to comply with building inspec-
tors’ requests. Id. at 537–38. Ultimately, the Naperville court followed Camara in holding that a lack 
of prosecutorial intent lessens an individual’s privacy interest. See Naperville, 900 F.3d at 527 (noting 
that the “[r]isk of corollary prosecution that troubled the court in Camara is minimal here”).  
 236 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 528. 
 237 Id. at 528–29. The court noted several benefits of smart meters. Id. Specifically, smart meters 
allow utilities to restore power quickly, time-based pricing results in cost savings, and smart meters 
encourage energy efficiency. Id.  
 238 See infra notes 239–246 and accompanying text. 
 239 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 527. The third-party doctrine typically applies to business records. See 
e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (phone records); United States v. Miller, 425 
U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (bank records); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 340 (1973) (tax docu-
ments). 
 240 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 527. Interestingly, the Northern District of Illinois applied the third-
party doctrine to smart meter data and found that Naperville citizens consented to the collection of 
their data. See Naperville I, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 840 (finding that the public utility could be considered a 
third-party for Fourth Amendment purposes). 
 241 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 527. According to one scholar, the court seemed to think that not ap-
plying the third-party doctrine was in favor of the defendants. See Kerr, Seventh Circuit Rules, supra 
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third party, Carpenter indicated that the doctrine would not apply in this 
case.242 Specifically, the court reasoned that because the Naperville citizens 
could not opt out of smart meter installation, they did not “voluntarily” share 
information with the public utility.243 Additionally, the court reasoned: 
If a person does not—in any meaningful sense—“voluntarily ‘as-
sume the risk’ of turning over a comprehensive dossier of physical 
movements” by choosing to use a cell phone, it also goes that a 
home occupant does not assume the risk of near constant monitoring 
by choosing to have electricity in her home.244 
Seemingly, the Seventh Circuit followed Carpenter in examining how vol-
untary an action must be to trigger the third-party doctrine.245 The court noted, 
however, that if the City gave Naperville citizens a choice to opt out of smart 
meter installation, “Naperville could have avoided this controversy.”246 The 
court did not address, however, whether a person who opts-in to smart meter 
installation, perhaps to save money, would be considered to have given up their 
Fourth Amendment rights in the data if the third-party doctrine applied.247 
                                                                                                                           
note 187. The court failed to consider the fact that the third-party doctrine evolved from cases where 
disclosures were made directly to the government. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 
750 (1971) (involving a confession of crimes to a friend wearing a wire); Hoffa v. United States, 385 
U.S. 293, 295 (1966) (regarding a person’s incriminating statements to a co-worker who was an un-
dercover informant); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966) (concerning a sale of marijua-
na to an undercover agent); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 435 (1963) (involving an attempt to 
bribe an IRS agent); Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 758 (1952) (holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment did not protect a person who made incriminating statements to a friend secretly working with the 
police). 
 242 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 527. Some commentators have suggested that in cases where law en-
forcement is involved, Carpenter does not apply because there would still be no third party. Bell, 
supra note 229; see Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth 
Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 51 (1995) (noting that “if the state can obtain the information only 
through means constituting a search or seizure, then use restrictions should apply, confining the gov-
ernmental authorities to uses consistent with the Amendment’s reasonableness requirement”). For 
example, because the “government,” or the public utility, has already collected the data, the legal 
landscape changes because the Fourth Amendment is not considered with the further sharing of in-
formation obtained by an initial search. Id.; Bell, supra note 229. 
 243 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 527. 
 244 Id. (quoting Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220). 
 245 Id. (noting that the action at issue in Carpenter—sharing location information with a phone 
company—is not “voluntary”). 
 246 Id. at 529. The court rejected the argument that Naperville citizens engaged in a “voluntary 
relationship” with the public utility to purchase electricity. Id. at 527. 
 247 Cf. id. at 527. 
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IV. SMART METER DATA SHOULD BE PROTECTED BY  
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches.248 
Whether a search has occurred depends, in part, on whether there is an expec-
tation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.249 Due to the granulari-
ty and wide latitude of information inferred from smart meter data, law en-
forcement agents will likely attempt to access such data soon.250 This is be-
cause smart meter data has the potential to alert law enforcement to a wide-
range of illicit behavior.251 Moreover, the data bears strong similarities to the 
searches in Kyllo and Carpenter.252 As a result, the Fourth Amendment should 
be applicable to smart meter data.253 Section A of this Part explains why an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the home supports the appli-
cation of the Fourth Amendment to smart meter data.254 Section B illustrates 
why the third-party doctrine does not apply to smart meter data.255 Section C 
clarifies the motivation behind requiring law enforcement to obtain a warrant 
to access smart meter data.256 
A. A Person Has a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Smart Meter Data 
The Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that, as far as the Fourth 
Amendment is concerned, the home is “first among equals.”257 Because smart 
                                                                                                                           
 248 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 249 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). To trigger the Fourth 
Amendment there must be government action. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) 
(emphasizing that “the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness”); Burdeau v. 
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (holding that an illegal search conducted by private persons did 
not implicate the Fourth Amendment). 
 250 NIST SMART GRID REPORT, supra note 7, at 11. The data will likely be sought for purposes 
that go beyond investigations into marijuana production. See United States v. Golden Valley Elec. 
Ass’n, 689 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012) (utilizing energy consumption records in a marijuana 
investigation); United States v. Hoang, 487 F. App’x 239, 245 (6th Cir. 2012) (utility records support-
ed probable cause for the search of defendant’s home); United States v. McIntyre, 646 F.3d 1107, 
1111 (8th Cir. 2011) (involving the use of electric records in a marijuana investigation); McKenna et 
al., supra note 22, at 808 (noting that law enforcement agencies could use smart meter data to detect a 
variety of illegal activities occurring in a person’s home). 
 251 Lerner & Mulligan, supra note 119, at 6. 
 252 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018) (involving a large quantity of 
cell-site location information that was aggregated to reveal a person’s behavior); Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (involving a search of the home utilizing thermal imaging technology). 
 253 See Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 529 (7th Cir. 
2018) (affording smart meter data Fourth Amendment protections when a public utility collects the 
data and citizens cannot opt-out). 
 254 See infra notes 257–288 and accompanying text. 
 255 See infra notes 289–304 and accompanying text. 
 256 See infra notes 305–318 and accompanying text. 
 257 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013); see California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) 
(finding that “privacy expectations are most heightened” in the context of the home); Oliver v. United 
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meters have the potential to reveal vast amounts of information about people’s 
habits in their homes, the resulting data is deserving of Fourth Amendment 
protection.258 In Kyllo, a federal agent used a thermal image scan to discern 
that the defendant had something in his home emitting an abnormally high 
amount of heat energy.259 There, the Supreme Court held that the thermal im-
age scan was a search.260 Similarly, a law enforcement agent could use smart 
meter data to determine that a person is growing marijuana due to abnormally 
high energy consumption.261 Though this inference has been supported by tra-
ditional energy records obtained via a subpoena, smart meter data goes a step 
further because it can precisely reveal that a person owns a marijuana grow 
light.262 
Moreover, smart meter data is sense-enhancing, as was the technology in 
Kyllo.263 It allows police to gain information otherwise unavailable without 
physical entry.264 But smart meters have the potential to reveal significantly 
more information about what goes on inside a home than the thermal imaging 
device in Kyllo.265 For example, smart meter data could reveal a surge of ener-
gy coming from a microwave at a particular time, which might be useful in a 
case where a microwave was being used as a murder weapon.266 Certainly, it 
                                                                                                                           
States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (extending the Fourth Amendment to areas “immediately surround-
ing and associated with the home”); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (noting that 
“at the very core” of the Fourth Amendment “stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home 
and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion”). 
 258 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SMART GRID REPORT, supra note 12, at 2 (providing that smart 
meters can uncover the times people are in their homes, when occupants shower, the types of appli-
ances in the home and when they are used); see also CRS SMART METER REPORT, supra note 6, at 4 
(describing several incriminating inferences resulting from smart meter data). 
 259 Kyllo, 533 U.S at 29. 
 260 Id. at 38. 
 261 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 526; see Kyllo, 533 U.S at 30 (noting that the FBI used high thermal 
energy records to obtain a warrant to search the defendant’s home based on suspicion that the defend-
ant was growing marijuana). 
 262 See Naperville, 900 F.3d at 526 (finding that smart meter data can be used to conclude that a 
person owns marijuana grow lights); United States v. McIntyre, 646 F.3d 1107, 1111 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(involving the use of electric records in a marijuana investigation). 
 263 Compare Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies, supra note 30, at 801 (arguing 
that “courts should place a thumb on the scale in favor of judicial caution when technology is in flux, 
and should consider allowing legislatures to provide the primary rules governing law enforcement 
investigations involving new technologies”), with Daniel J. Solove, The Coexistence of Privacy and 
Security: Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial Defer-
ence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 747 (2005) (criticizing Orin Kerr’s approach and demonstrating that 
legislative rules are deficient when compared to the Fourth Amendment). 
 264 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SMART GRID REPORT, supra note 12, at 2 (explaining how smart 
meter data can lead to information about what a person is doing in their home). 
 265 CRS SMART METER REPORT, supra note 6, at 19; see Naperville, 900 F.3d at 526 (comparing 
smart meter data to the thermal imaging device used in Kyllo). 
 266 See NIST SMART GRID REPORT, supra note 7, at 34 (noting that smart meter data can reveal 
when a microwave is in use); Mike Riggs, The Microwave as a Murder Weapon: A Brief History, 
CITYLAB (Mar. 13, 2014), https://www.citylab.com/life/2014/03/microwave-murder-weapon-brief-
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would be difficult for police to learn this information without entering a per-
son’s home at that time.267 
In Carpenter, the FBI used hundreds of cell-site location data points to 
conclude that the suspect was in the vicinity of the robberies at the time they 
took place.268 Like CSLI, smart meter data is time-stamped; it can reveal what 
a person is doing in their home at a particular time.269 This allows law en-
forcement agents to “travel back in time,” limited only by how long the utility 
company retains the data.270 It is hard to imagine a more “intimate window 
into a person’s life” than discerning whether a person is home, away, asleep, 
awake, eating, doing laundry, watching television, or listening to music at a 
certain time.271 Moreover, like Carpenter, these data points are collected with-
in seconds.272 By amassing this type of data over, for example four months, 
law enforcement could re-create a person’s home life down to every fifteen 
seconds over those four months.273 
In 2018, the Seventh Circuit held in Naperville that citizens have Fourth 
Amendment rights in the collection of their smart meter data.274 The court, 
however, left a fracture in their Fourth Amendment analysis.275 Specifically, 
the Seventh Circuit found that smart meters are not yet in general public use, 
so it would be unfair for the government to collect this data without deeming it 
a search.276 The court relied on Kyllo, where the Supreme Court found the fact 
that thermal-imaging devices were not yet in general public use to be signifi-
cant in holding that the search of the home violated the Fourth Amendment.277 
                                                                                                                           
history/8626/ [https://perma.cc/7WJJ-MN5V] (discussing microwaves being used as murder weap-
ons). 
 267 See Riggs, supra note 266 (describing some of the challenges associated with investigation of 
crimes where a microwave was being used as a murder weapon). 
 268 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221. 
 269 See NIST SMART GRID REPORT, supra note 7, at 31. 
 270 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218; see NIST SMART GRID REPORT, supra note 7, at 55 (proposing 
that smart meter data “should be retained only for as long as necessary to fulfill the purposes that have 
been communicated to energy consumers”). 
 271 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217; see CRS SMART METER REPORT, supra note 6, at 4 (describing 
the inferences that smart meter data can make). 
 272 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (noting that cell-site location information is “detailed, ency-
clopedic, and effortlessly compiled”); CRS SMART METER REPORT, supra note 6, at 4 (providing that 
smart meter data is collected every fifteen seconds); Bloom & Clark, supra note 61, at 197 (describing 
the science behind cell-site location information and emphasizing that a cell phone can ping to a cell 
tower every few seconds). 
 273 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (noting that “mapping a cell phone’s location over the 
course of 127 days provides an all-encompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts”). 
 274 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 527. 
 275 See Kerr, Seventh Circuit Rules, supra note 187 (criticizing the Naperville decision). 
 276 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 527. 
 277 Id.; see Kyllo, 533 U.S at 34 (explaining the “general public use” exception). The “general 
public use” doctrine appears to sanction the reduced Fourth Amendment protections when the relevant 
technology is widely used. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 46–47 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Adkins, supra note 
820 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:785 
There, the Supreme Court implied that once a technology is in general public 
use then Fourth Amendment protections will disappear.278 It is unclear what 
the standard for general public use is, but according to current statistics, smart 
meters are used in a majority of American homes.279 The “general public use” 
exception thus has the potential to undermine and threaten the Fourth Amend-
ment protections that smart meter data should be afforded.280 
Instead, the Seventh Circuit should have distinguished the general public 
use exception in Kyllo and Naperville by inquiring into the purpose of the new 
technology.281 In Kyllo, police used the technology for the sole purpose of in-
vestigation.282 In contrast, utility companies use smart meters like traditional 
meters, to collect energy readings.283 These divergent purposes should be le-
gally significant if the policy behind the general public use exception is given 
any weight.284 The general public use exception is premised on the notion that 
police should not use technology-assisted devices that the general public does 
not have access to in order to bypass the Fourth Amendment.285 This policy is 
not as sound when it comes to smart meter data because the data is being cre-
ated regardless of an investigative purpose; the data is not being created at the 
                                                                                                                           
55, at 252–67 (explaining the subjectivity involved in any application of the “general public use” 
doctrine). 
 278 Kyllo, 533 U.S at 46–47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 279 See Adkins, supra note 55, at 245 (explaining the lack of Supreme Court guidance on the 
“general public use” doctrine); CRS SMART METER REPORT, supra note 6, at 18 (describing the un-
certainty regarding the “general public use” doctrine’s applicability to smart meter data); U.S. Energy 
Info. Admin., supra note 192 (noting that approximately fifty percent of U.S. customers have smart 
meter data). Compare United States v. Vela, 486 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (finding 
vision goggles used by the military to be in general public use because one could purchase the goggles 
online), with United States v. Dellas, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1107 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (denying Fourth 
Amendment protection to vision goggles). 
 280 Adkins, supra note 55, at 245; see Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the 
Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. 
L. REV. 1393, 1400–08 (2002) (exploring what it means for something to be in general public use); S. 
Alex Spelman, Drones: Updating the Fourth Amendment and the Technological Trespass Doctrine, 
16 NEV. L.J. 373, 378 (2015) (arguing that the “general public use doctrine” wrongly denies Fourth 
Amendment protections to popular technologies, such as drones).  
 281 See Kyllo, 533 U.S at 29 (describing the FBI’s use of the thermal imaging device to scan the 
defendant’s home). 
 282 Id. 
 283 See CRS SMART METER REPORT, supra note 6, at 5 (explaining how frequent data collection 
helps utility companies identify electricity demand and set electric prices). Yet courts should treat 
smart meters differently than traditional meters because they have the potential to reveal much more 
information. See NIST SMART GRID REPORT, supra note 7, at 9 (describing the differences between 
smart meter data and traditional energy data and explaining the inferences made from smart meter 
data). 
 284 See infra notes 285–288 and accompanying text. 
 285 See Kyllo, 533 U.S at 34–35 (discussing the significance of the fact that the thermal imaging 
device was not in general public use and the impact it has on an individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy). 
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direction of law enforcement agents.286 In sum, smart meters have an inde-
pendent purpose, whereas the thermal imaging device in Kyllo was used solely 
for investigative purposes.287 Although the Seventh Circuit found that the gen-
eral public use exception does not apply because smart meters are not general-
ly used, the court nonetheless sanctioned future courts to remove Fourth 
Amendment protections after a court finds that a majority of American homes 
have smart meters.288 
B. The Third-Party Doctrine Should Not Apply to Smart Meter Data 
In 2018, the Seventh Circuit in Naperville held that the third-party doc-
trine did not apply because no third party was involved; the smart meter data 
flowed directly from the individual to the government.289 In cases where law 
enforcement is involved, however, one can assume that there are three parties: 
the individual, the utility, and law enforcement.290 Nonetheless, in the case 
where law enforcement seeks access to smart meter data, the third-party doc-
trine should not apply.291 
Individuals likely do not assume the risk of releasing data to law en-
forcement when they own a smart meter, or at least do not assume the risk of 
releasing the inferences drawn therefrom.292 In other words, even if a person 
                                                                                                                           
 286 See CRS SMART METER REPORT, supra note 6, at 2 (explaining the history behind smart me-
ters as a means to combat challenges resulting from the need to modernize the electrical grid). 
 287 Compare Kyllo, 533 U.S at 29 (describing the FBI’s use of the thermal imaging device to scan 
the defendant’s home for evidence connecting the suspect to marijuana production), with NIST 
SMART GRID REPORT, supra note 7, at 29 (describing non-investigatory purposes of smart meters to 
increase energy efficiency and reduce costs for utilities and consumers). 
 288 See Naperville, 900 F.3d at 526–27 (finding that smart meters are not yet in general public 
use). 
 289 Id. at 525. 
 290 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (involving an individual, a phone 
company, and law enforcement); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (involving an 
individual, a bank, and law enforcement); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 340 (1973) (involv-
ing an individual, an accountant, and law enforcement); McIntyre, 646 F.3d at 1111 (applying the 
third-party doctrine to traditional energy data, holding that a person does not have a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in such data). In the case of a public utility, however, the rationale behind the third-
party doctrine might still apply. See Kerr, Seventh Circuit Rules, supra note 187 (opining that volun-
tarily sharing data directly to a public utility is more on par with the “secret agent” cases that recog-
nize that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily shared 
with the government). 
 291 See Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine Should 
Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013) (arguing that the third party doctrine should not apply to inter-
net records); Alexander Porter, Note, “Time Works Changes”: Modernizing Fourth Amendment Law 
to Protect Cell Site Location Information, 57 B.C.L. REV. 1781, 1789 (2016) (arguing that the third 
party doctrine should not be applied to cell-site location information). 
 292 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 526–27; see Bloom & Clark, supra note 61, at 197 (arguing that a 
person does not voluntarily convey cell-site location information to phone companies because there is 
no affirmative action). Owning a cell phone is almost a prerequisite for participating in society. Bloom 
& Clark, supra note 61, at 198; see People v. Chapman, 679 P.2d 62, 67 (Cal. 1984) (noting that 
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understands that a utility is collecting their energy meter readings, it is unlikely 
that anyone meaningfully consents to the inferences drawn therefrom.293 In 
Naperville, the court indicated that if citizens could opt out of smart meter in-
stallation, the third-party doctrine might apply.294 Nonetheless, courts should 
look not at whether an individual chose to engage in the behavior in question, 
but whether the person could reasonably expect that the inferences made from 
the data would be shared with law enforcement.295 Indeed, the underlying ra-
tionale of the third-party doctrine is that the Fourth Amendment does not pro-
tect voluntary disclosures.296 
In Carpenter, the Supreme Court recognized that by making the affirma-
tive decision to own a cellphone, people did not realize that they were allowing 
the government to access “an exhaustive chronicle of location information.”297 
Law enforcement values CSLI because of the inferences it can provide.298 
Thus, Carpenter stands for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment should 
protect individuals when these inferences do not give rise to a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.299 The Supreme Court emphasized this idea, even though 
most individuals would likely not be surprised to learn that their phone was 
tracking their location.300 In the case of smart meter data, however, people 
would be surprised to know that their energy meter data could reveal what time 
they wake up and go to sleep.301 Therefore, it is not accurate to say that indi-
viduals “voluntarily” share their smart meter data with the utility company.302 
                                                                                                                           
“[d]oing without a telephone is not a realistic option for most people”); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 
135, 141 (Colo. 1983) (“A telephone is a necessary component of modern life. It is a personal and 
business necessity indispensable to one’s ability to effectively communicate in today’s complex socie-
ty.”). By merely owning a phone a person does not voluntarily convey their location to their phone 
company. Bloom & Clark, supra note 61, at 198. Similarly, by choosing to have electricity, which 
doing without “is not a realistic option for most people,” a person does not voluntarily convey their 
activities in the home to their energy utility company. Chapman, 679 P.2d at 67; see Bloom & Clark, 
supra note 61, at 197–98 (discussing the third-party doctrine’s applicability to cell-site location in-
formation). 
 293 Naperville, 900 F.3d at 526–27. 
 294 Id. at 524. 
 295 See id. (emphasizing the highly personal nature of the inferences made from smart meter data). 
 296 Smith, 442 U.S at 743–44; Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
 297 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219; cf. Smith, 442 U.S at 745 (holding that individuals do not ex-
pect their phone records to remain private). 
 298 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (explaining that law enforcement agents aimed to use the 
CSLI to place the suspect at the scene of the crime). 
 299 See id. (holding that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in physical movements). 
 300 See id. 
 301 See CRS SMART METER REPORT, supra note 6, at 22 (noting that “[e]ven if customers are 
aware their utility usage can be recorded in sub-fifteen-minute intervals, a reasonable customer would 
probably be surprised, if not shocked, to know that data from smart meters can potentially be used to 
pinpoint the usage of specific appliances”). 
 302 See Bloom & Clark, supra note 61, at 192 (emphasizing that the third-party doctrine should 
not apply to cell-site information because it is “generated without the user’s knowledge and often 
without any accompanying affirmative act”). 
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The reasoning of Naperville inappropriately enables the application of the 
third-party doctrine to cases where citizens have a genuine opportunity to con-
sent to smart meter data.303 Smart meters offer tremendous benefits for con-
sumers over traditional meters.304 If citizens make the conscious choice to 
adopt a smart meter in their home instead of a traditional meter, the third-party 
doctrine still should not apply.305 This is because a person does not voluntarily 
share the inferences made from smart meter data in any “meaningful sense.”306 
C. The Need for a Warrant: Compelling a Third Party to Turn Over  
Data Instead of Law Enforcement Seeking It Directly Is Not a  
Legally Significant Difference 
Recognizing a person’s Fourth Amendment rights in smart meter data, the 
best way to ensure that those rights are protected is to follow Carpenter and 
apply the warrant requirement.307 In 2011, the Eighth Circuit in United States 
v. McIntyre, held that there was a minimal intrusion on a person’s privacy 
when a subpoena was used to compel records.308 Justice Alito also takes this 
position in his dissent in Carpenter.309 In Justice Alito’s view, the legal stand-
ard should be considered together with whether there is a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.310 Thus, documents that are compelled via a subpoena or other 
administrative process, do not intrude on a person’s privacy in a way that has 
been typically recognized by the Fourth Amendment.311 
                                                                                                                           
 303 See Naperville, 900 F.3d at 529 (noting that the city “could have avoided this controversy” if 
citizens could opt-out of smart meter installation and finding that smart meters were applying the 
“general public use” doctrine). 
 304 See id. (performing a balancing test and concluding that the government has a strong interest 
in smart meters due to the cost-saving benefits); U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, AMI REPORT, supra note 9, 
at 12 (reporting the cost-saving results during a test of 16.3 million smart meters); SIEMENS, supra 
note 195, at 3 (explaining the possible reduction of electric demand due to smart meters); U.S. Dep’t 
of Energy Office of Elec. Delivery & Energy Reliability, supra note 210 (discussing several benefits 
of smart meters, such as time-based pricing). 
 305 See Bloom & Clark, supra note 61, at 196–98 (offering support for the proposition that the 
third-party doctrine should focus on voluntariness). 
 306 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (holding that a person does not “meaningful[ly]” share their 
location data with their phone company). 
 307 See id. (requiring a warrant to access seven days of cell-site location information); supra notes 
257–304 and accompanying text (arguing that the Fourth Amendment protects smart meter data). 
 308 McIntyre, 646 F.3d at 1111. Similarly, in 2006, the United States District Court for the District 
of Oregon in United States v. Hamilton found that it was “legally significant” that power records were 
obtained via a subpoena, rather than by intruding on the home by thermal-imaging technology used in 
Kyllo. United States v. Hamilton, 434 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (D. Or. 2006). 
 309 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2250–57 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 310 Id. 
 311 Id. 
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Rejecting this argument, the majority in Carpenter is sympathetic to what 
privacy means in a digital age.312 How law enforcement is collecting data is 
becoming less important.313 Though illegal searches are generally thought to 
occur in a situation where police barge into a person’s home, technology is 
enabling police to gain access to everything they could by walking into the 
home, without entering.314 After Carpenter, if the government wants to collect 
CSLI or other records in which a person has Fourth Amendment rights, the 
government must use a warrant regardless of whether the data is stored at 
home or remotely.315 In the “rare case” of smart meter data, requiring law en-
forcement to obtain a warrant is the only way to protect a person’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.316 One scholar has even argued that there should be a stricter 
standard beyond a warrant’s probable cause requirement because smart meter 
data is so personal.317 If a subpoena could be used to obtain smart meter data, 
there would be virtually limitless government collection of personal data.318 
The reasonableness standard for a subpoena is too low of a standard to satisfy 
in order to protect people from unwanted government intrusion.319 Ultimately, 
                                                                                                                           
 312 See id. at 2214 (majority opinion) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court has adjusted the 
Fourth Amendment framework where necessary to keep up with technologies and to preserve expecta-
tions of privacy). 
 313 See id. at 2222 (holding that accessing cell-site data from a third party warrants an application 
of the Fourth Amendment). 
 314 See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (holding a thermal imaging device allowed law enforcement 
agents to see inside the home, when they otherwise would not be able to). In the case of smart meter 
data, law enforcement could likely learn even more information than they could by entering a home. 
See NIST SMART GRID REPORT, supra note 7, at 32 n.81 (discussing the various inferences smart 
meter data can reveal, including the fact that a person lost their job because they were spending large 
amounts of time at home). Thus, although Carpenter’s holding may have signaled a drastic change 
because it blurred the lines between compelling records and taking them, the holding was necessary if 
the Fourth Amendment is designed to protect reasonable expectations of privacy. See Bloom & Clark, 
supra note 61, at 196 (arguing that cell-site location information deserves Fourth Amendment protec-
tion). 
 315 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222 (holding that “a warrant is required in the rare case where 
the suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party”). 
 316 See id. (holding that law enforcement needs to meet the probable cause standard before access-
ing data held by a third party in which a subject has Fourth Amendment rights). 
 317 See Bell, supra note 229 (positing that “perhaps the quantum of evidence required should be a 
bit higher given the granularity of the information such smart meters can provide regarding a person’s 
activities inside their home, a location entitled to the highest privacy protections”). Some have argued 
that states will do a better job at protecting smart meter data than the Fourth Amendment. Balough, 
supra note 5, at 160, 183–85; Duarte, supra note 5, at 1154. 
 318 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222 (noting that “[i]f the choice to proceed by subpoena provid-
ed a categorical limitation on Fourth Amendment protection, no type of record would ever be protect-
ed by the warrant requirement . . . . [A]ny personal information reduced to document form, [could] be 
collected by subpoena for no reason other than ‘official curiosity’”). Warrantless searches “are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
 319 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222 (recognizing that, to satisfy the Fourth Amendment, a war-
rant is required to access information in which a person has Fourth Amendment rights). 
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the probable cause requirement to obtain a warrant is the only way to protect a 
person’s Fourth Amendment rights in smart meter data.320 
CONCLUSION 
Smart meters, and the technology that enables them, present novel issues 
regarding the applicability of the Fourth Amendment. At first glance, it may 
appear as though a traditional Fourth Amendment framework is sufficient to 
address these issues. As this Note has argued, however, applying that frame-
work would lead to decreased protections for individuals in their homes, an 
area traditionally given substantial constitutional protections. As the Supreme 
Court highlighted in Carpenter, courts should consider the potential impact of 
new technologies on personal privacy when determining how to treat such 
technologies under the Fourth Amendment. Ultimately, the rich detail of smart 
meter data has the potential to reveal personal information about what takes 
place in a person’s home. Requiring law enforcement officials to obtain a war-
rant before accessing smart meter data is the best way to properly balance the 
government interest in investigating crimes while protecting a fundamental 
liberty recognized by the Fourth Amendment. 
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